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4 The European Migration Network
The European Migration Network
The European Migration Network (EMN) was laun
ched by the European Commission in 2003 due to an 
initiative of the European Council in order to satisfy 
the need of a regular exchange of reliable information 
in the field of migration and asylum at the European 
level. Since 2008, Council Decision 2008/381/EC 
forms the permanent legal basis of the EMN and 
National Contact Points have been established in the 
EU Member States (with the exception of Denmark, 
which has observer status) plus Norway.
-
The EMN’s role is to meet the information needs of 
European Union institutions, Member States’ autho
rities and institutions as well as the wider public by 
providing up-to-date, objective, reliable and compara
ble information on migration and asylum, with a view 
to supporting policymaking in these areas. The National 
Contact Point for Germany is located at the Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees in Nuremberg. 
Its main task is to implement the annual work pro
gramme of the EMN. This includes the drafting of  
the annual policy report “Migration, Integration, Asy
lum” and of up to four topic specific studies, as well as 
answering Ad-Hoc Queries launched by other Natio
nal Contact Points or the European Commission. The 
German National Contact Point also carries out visi
bility activities and networking in several forums, e.g. 
through the organisation of conferences or the partici
pation in conferences in Germany and abroad. Further
more, the National Contact Points in each country 
set up national networks consisting of organisations, 
institutions and individuals working in the field of 
migration and asylum.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
In general, the National Contact Points do not conduct 
primary research but collect, analyse and present exis
ting data. Exceptions might occur when existing data 
and information are not sufficient. EMN studies are 
elaborated in accordance with uniform specifications 
valid for all EU Member States plus Norway in order 
to achieve comparable EU-wide results. Furthermore, 
the EMN has produced a Glossary, which ensures the 
application of comparable terms and definitions in all 
national reports and is available on the national and 
international EMN websites.
-
Upon completion of national reports, the European 
Commission drafts a synthesis report with the support 
of a service provider. This report summarises the most 
significant results of the individual national reports. 
In addition, topic-based policy briefs, so-called EMN 
Informs, are produced in order to present and compare 
selected topics in a concise manner. The EMN Bulletin, 
which is published quarterly, informs about current de
velopments in the EU and the Member States. With the 
work programme of 2014, the Return Expert Group 
(REG) was created to address issues around voluntary 
return, reintegration and forced return.
-
All EMN publications are available on the website of 
the European Commission Directorate-General for Mi
gration and Home Affairs. The national studies of the 
German National Contact Point as well as the synthe
sis reports, Informs and the Glossary are also available 
on the national website: www.emn-germany.de.
-
-
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Summary
In response to the Islamist terrorist attacks in vari
ous cities, including Paris (2015), Brussels (2016), 
Nice (2016), Berlin (2016) and London (2017), the se
curity debate in the European Union (EU), including 
Germany, focused primarily on measures to combat 
Islamist radicalisation and violent extremism. The fact 
that some of the persons who carried out attacks were 
third-country nationals directed attention to mea
sures aimed at this category of people. In Germany, 
following the terrorist attack on a Christmas market 
in Berlin on 19 December 2016, operational measu
res were undertaken concerning cooperation between 
relevant authorities, as well as restrictive measures 
under residence law.
-
-
-
-
The migration authorities – that is, the Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees and the foreigners autho
rities – perform various functions relating to third
country nationals who constitute a threat to public 
security. The Federal Office for Migration and Refu
gees is assigned a coordinating role with regard to the 
transfer of information and the evaluation of security-
related intelligence between the security services and 
the migration authorities. In this capacity, the Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees has overall charge 
of the working group ‘Status-Related Accompanying 
Measures’ at the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre 
(Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum, GTAZ), for 
example. In this working group, lines of action relating 
to measures under the law on foreigners, asylum and 
nationality against persons with an Islamist terrorist 
background are discussed.
-
-
-
The Federal Government supports various projects 
to prevent extremism and promote democracy. The 
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees is also 
active in the field of preventive work, with its “Radica
lisation” counselling centre offering advice for people 
who fear that someone they know is undergoing 
Islamist radicalisation. The German authorities pursue 
an overall approach combining both repressive and 
preventive measures against extremism.
-
The migration authorities and security services pursue 
various residence-related and residence-terminating 
measures against third-country nationals who con
stitute a threat to public security, the security of the 
Federal Republic of Germany or the free democratic 
basic order. These include non-extension of the resi
-
-
dence permit, withdrawal and revocation of the 
residence permit and the protection status, return, 
location monitoring, the prohibition and restriction of 
political activities and bans on entry into and residence 
in the federal territory. The competent authorities face 
major legal challenges above all with regard to resi
dence-terminating measures. Such challenges apply 
where no travel documents are available or where 
there are concerns that the person concerned could 
be tortured in the country of destination on account 
of the grounds for their removal.
-
Information sharing between different authorities and 
actors in Germany has proven effective in recent years 
as a result of its ongoing development and instituti
onalisation. To date, there is no comparable commu
nication and coordination platform at European level 
enabling communication between the migration au
thorities and the security services. Information sha
ring between Germany and other EU Member States 
on security-related aspects in connection with third
country nationals takes place on a bilateral basis. In 
the ongoing course of development of the Schengen 
Information System (SIS) it is intended to establish a 
database, however, which will make asylum-related 
decisions accessible at European level from 2022 and 
also open up access to residence-related decisions in 
some areas.
-
-
-
-
-
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8 Introduction
1 Introduction 
Following the Islamist terrorist attacks in various 
cities, including Paris (2015), Brussels (2016), Nice 
(2016), Berlin (2016) and London (2017), the security 
debate in the European Union (EU), including Ger
many, shifted its focus to measures to counter Isla
mist radicalisation and violent extremism. The fact that 
some of the attacks were perpetrated by third-coun
try nationals directed attention to measures aimed at 
this category of people. In Germany, for example, fol
lowing the terrorist attack on a Christmas market at 
Breitscheidplatz in Berlin on 19 December 2016, ope
rational measures were undertaken aimed at impro
ving cooperation between relevant authorities, as well 
as various restrictive measures under residence law 
(Chapter 2.3 and Chapter 5.4).
-
-
-
-
-
-
Despite the focus of security policy on Islamist third-
country nationals, radicalisation and extremism are 
neither a specifically religious phenomenon, neither 
do they represent a problem which is specific to 
third-country nationals1 (Koser/Cunningham 2017). 
Numerous Germans are also associated with the Is
lamist spectrum, for example, in addition to which a 
distinction needs to be made between different cate
gories of extremism (right-wing extremism, left-wing 
extremism and Islamist terrorism, for example).
-
-
The fact that the main focus of this study is never
theless on third-country nationals and the role of the 
migration authorities is attributable to two reasons: 
Firstly, specific influencing factors can play a role in 
the radicalisation of third-country nationals. In addi
tion to factors unrelated to someone’s origins, such 
as the social environment and economic conditions, 
these can be identity conflicts, experience of discrimi
nation, cultural marginalisation and influences from 
the country of origin. These factors can make certain 
persons susceptible to approaches by extremist groups 
(Gafarova 2018: 1). Secondly, with regard to third-
country nationals the migration authorities can play an 
important role in the fields of identification and pre
vention which does not apply in the case of German 
extremists. With regard to measures to ensure public 
-
-
-
-
security, the provisions of the law on residence provide 
the relevant authorities with different options that 
apply to German nationals or nationals of the Euro
pean Union (EU). Residence-terminating measures can 
be taken in certain circumstances, for example, and the 
migration authorities play an important role here. This 
study thus examines the specific role of the migration 
authorities with regard to third-country nationals who 
constitute a threat to public security. The security ser
vices’ scope of tasks are consequently not part of the 
study. The focus of the study is on third-country natio
nals who are legally residing in Germany. The purview 
of this study does not extend to persons who are irre
gularly resident in Germany and asylum seekers who 
are undergoing the asylum procedure. 
The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees and 
the foreigners authorities play a particularly important 
role in this context – in establishing security-related 
findings and intelligence and cooperation with the 
security services (Chapter 3.1), in prevention and dera
dicalisation work (Chapter 4), in implementing measu
res under residence law (Chapter 5) and in the field of 
cooperation with other EU Member States (Chapter 6), 
for example.
The regulatory and organisational framework under
lying the individual measures in dealing with third-
country nationals who constitute a threat to public 
security is regulated by numerous laws, ordinances, 
regulations, decrees and directives at Land and federal 
level. This framework is also increasingly influenced by 
EU Directives and Regulations. 
This study has been drawn up within the context of 
the European Migration Network (EMN).
1 The Schengen Borders Code defines third-country nationals 
as all persons who are not nationals of an EU Member State, 
a Member State of the European Economic Area (EEA) or  
Switzerland.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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Sources
In addition to the legal and organisational terms of 
reference and the latest developments in the policy 
field, numerous sources were employed for the pur
poses of this study. The most important sources are 
legal texts and administrative regulations on the law as 
applies to foreigners and residence and answers from 
the Federal Government to questions submitted in the 
Bundestag. Additional data were gathered from stati
stical reports of the Federal Statistical Office, Euro
stat and the Federal Ministry of the Interior. Further 
information was obtained directly from the compe
tent authorities (Federal Office for Migration and Re
fugees, Federal Criminal Police Office). Reference was 
also made to national and international studies and 
newspaper reports.
-
-
-
-
-
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2 Threat to public security: 
national context and definitions
Discussion on the topic of threats to public security in 
Germany involves a number of terms which are com
monly and sometimes interchangeably employed in 
public debates and media reports, but which actually 
require to be distinguished, as they encompass quite 
distinct aspects, at least in terms of legal and security 
considerations. The relevant key terms are thus defi
ned below (Chapter 2.1) to facilitate an understanding 
of the spheres of activity and authorisation pertaining 
to the respective individuals and authorities involved. 
This study focuses on the functions of the migration 
authorities2 in connection with third-country nationals 
who hold a residence permit3 and constitute a threat 
to public security and order. Consequently, the study 
refers primarily to provisions which apply under the 
law on foreigners. In addition, statistics are presen
ted both on politically motivated crime (PMC) and on 
potential offenders and persons of interest (Chapter 
2.2). This chapter also introduces the political debate 
in Germany on the topic of threats to public security, 
particularly in connection with third-country natio
nals (Chapter 2.3). In recent years, this debate has cen
tred first and foremost on the threat posed by Islamist 
terrorism.
2 Migration authorities in the context of this study are those au
thorities which are responsible for the issuance, withdrawal and 
revocation of residence permits for third-country nationals and 
decisions to repatriate such persons, that is, the Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees and the foreigners authorities. 
3 For the purposes of this study, a residence permit is any permit 
issued by the authorities of an EU Member State which entitles 
a third-country national to lawfully reside in the territories of 
the EU Member State concerned for at least three months. As 
such, the scope of this study does not include persons who hold 
permission to remain pending an asylum decision or for whom a 
suspension of removal applies.
2.1 Terms and definitions
Legal texts commonly cite public security and order, 
the security of the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the free democratic basic order. The terms “public 
order” and “public security” are derived from general 
police law (Federal Police Act)4 and the Länder laws on 
police duties. The term “security of the Federal 
Republic of Germany” is to be found in the penal code 
(Strafgesetzbuch) and the term “free democratic basic 
order” is employed in the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). 
Other European Member States also use the term “na
tional security”, which constitutes a sub-category of 
public security. “National security” is not defined in 
German police law, however. The EU acquis also refers 
to the concept of public security, rather than national 
security.
-
4 German: Gesetz über die Bundespolizei (BPolG).
2.1.1 Public order
The Federal Constitutional Court defines “public 
order” as “the collective body of unwritten rules 
which, according to the prevailing social and ethical 
tenets, is considered imperative for orderly human 
co-existence within a certain region” (Federal Consti
tutional Court, ruling of 14 May 19855). As this defi
nition by the Federal Constitutional Court shows, the 
term is vague and thus requires interpretation. In con
junction with the Residence Act,6 the concept of public 
order is to be “understood within the meaning of po
lice and regulatory law” (55.1.1.1 of the General Admi
nistrative Regulation to the Residence Act).
-
-
-
-
-
5 Federal Constitutional Court, ruling of 14 May 1985 – 1 BvR 
233/81, 341/81 – NJW 1985, 2395 <2398>.
6 German: Gesetz über den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit 
und die Integration von Ausländerinnen und Ausländern im 
Bundesgebiet.
2.1.2 Public security
The concept of “public security”, which is central to 
this study, is “open and in need of interpretation”, and 
in the German context is also derived from police law 
(Gusy/Worms 2019: § 1 PolG NRW, marginal note 
47). “Public security is the inviolability of the objective 
legal system, the subjective rights and legal interests 
of the individual and the institutions and functions 
of the state and other holders of public authority” 
(55.1.1.1 of the General Administrative Regulation to 
the Residence Act). The Residence Act employs the 
-
-
-
-
-
-
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combined concept of “public security and order” with 
regard to third-country nationals who constitute a 
threat7.
This study primarily employs the concept of public 
security as, in contrast to public order, this clearly rela
tes to the security of the legal system and the govern
mental institutions and is at the same time defined in 
broad terms, with due regard to the scale of the threat 
involved. Where other concepts of security (the secu
rity of the Federal Republic, for example) are employed 
in the following study and in the relevant legal texts, 
this is indicated accordingly. 
-
-
-
7 With regard to application of the combined concept in the 
Residence Act, see Section 11 subs. 2 and 5 (Ban on entry and 
residence), Section 27 subs. 3a no. 4 (Family reunification), 
Section 47 subs. 1 no. 1 (Prohibition and restriction of political 
activities), Section 53 subs. 1 and 3 (Expulsion), Section 54 subs. 
1 no. 5 (Interest in expulsion), Section 56 subs. 1 no. 2 (Monito
ring for internal security reasons of foreigners required to leave 
the country) or Section 59 subs. 7 no. 1 (Removal warning) of the 
Residence Act.
2.1.3 Security of the Federal Republic 
of Germany
According to the Federal Administrative Court, the 
term “security of the Federal Republic of Germany” 
refers to both internal and external security for the 
purposes of the continued existence and the “effective 
functioning of the state and its institutions” (Section 
92 subs. 3 no. 2 of the Penal Code; Federal Administra
tive Court ruling of 15 March 20058). The term “secu
rity of the Federal Republic of Germany” also occurs 
in the Residence Act in connection with more restric
tive measures pertaining to the residence of third-
country nationals who constitute a threat (the remo
val order pursuant to Section 58a of the Residence Act, 
for example9)10. The security of the Federal Republic of 
Germany is to be understood as a more narrowly de
fined concept than public security. As such, not every 
“encroachment of public security” resulting from a 
-
-
-
-
-
breach of law also constitutes a “threat to ‘internal se
curity’” (54.2.2.2 of the General Administrative Regula
tion to the Residence Act). 
8 Federal Administrative Court, ruling of 15 March 2005 – 1 C 
26.03 [ECLI:DE:BVerwG:2005:150305U1C26.03.0] – NVwZ 2005, 
1091 <1092>.
9 “The removal order [...] comprises both expulsion and the 
enforcement order and also entails the imposition of detention 
to prepare removal, where removal cannot be effected immedia
tely [...]. It is an exceptional provision to address special dangers” 
(Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik 2017: 19).
10 With regard to application of the term in the Residence Act, 
see Section 11 subs. 5a (Ban on entry and residence), Section 
25 subs. 3 no. 4 (Residence on humanitarian grounds), Section 
27 subs. 3a no. 1 (Principles pertaining to the subsequent im
migration of dependents), Section 47 subs. 2 no 1 (Prohibition 
and restriction of political activities), Section 53 subs. 3a and 3b 
(Expulsion), Section 54 subs. 1 no. 2 and subs. 2 no. 7 (Interest 
in expulsion), Section 58a subs. 1 (Removal order), Section 
60 subs. 8 (Prohibition of deportation) of the Residence Act.
-
-
-
-
-
2.1.4 Free democratic basic order 
The “free democratic basic order pursuant to Art. 21 
paragraph 2 of the Basic Law is an order which repre
sents a constitutional system of rule which, to the ex
clusion of any form of violence and arbitrary rule, is 
based on the self-determination of the people and in 
accordance with the will of the prevailing majority and 
founded on freedom and equality” (Federal Constitu
tional Court, judgement of 23 October 195211). This 
comprises:
-
-
-
 the respect of human rights, in particular the 
individual’s right to life and the free development 
of one’s personality,
 the sovereignty of the people,
 the separation of powers,
 the responsibility of the government,
 the conformity of the administration to the law,
 the independence of the courts,
 the multi-party system,
 and “equality of opportunity for all political parties, 
with the right to form and pursue an opposition” 
(Federal Constitutional Court, judgement of 23  
October 1952).
As such, the free democratic basic order is a more 
comprehensive concept than the other security con
cepts and incorporates the essential characteristics of 
democracy and the constitutional state. According to 
the Federal Constitutional Court, the Basic Law thus 
champions a “disputatious democracy” and thus also 
enables the prohibition of political parties, for example 
(Federal Constitutional Court, judgement of 17 August 
195612).
-
11 Federal Administrative Court, judgement of 23 October 1952 – 1 
BvB 1/51 – NJW 1592, 1407 <1407>.
12 Federal Administrative Court, judgement of 17 August 1956 – 1 
BvB 2/51 – NJW 1956, 1393 <1397>.
In the Residence Act, the concept of the “free demo
cratic order” is cited primarily in connection with more 
restrictive measures relating to residence issues (the 
prohibition rather than the restriction of political acti-
-
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vities, for example – Section 47 subs. 2 no. 1 of the 
Residence Act).13
13 With regard to application of the term in the Residence Act, see 
Section 25a subs. 1 no. 5 (Granting of residence in the case of 
well integrated juveniles and young adults), Section 25b subs. 1 
no. 2 (Granting of residence in the case of lasting integration), 
Section 27 subs. 3a no. 1 (Subsequent immigration of depend
ants), Section 47 subs. 2 no. 1 (Prohibition and restriction of 
political activities), Section 53 subs. 1 (Expulsion), Section 54 
subs. 1 no. 2 and subs. 2 no. 7 of the Residence Act (Interest in 
expulsion).
2.1.5 Threat to public security and order
A “threat” is generally defined in police law as a situ
ation “in which there is a sufficient likelihood that an 
object of legal protection will be detrimentally affec
ted in the foreseeable future if no action is undertaken 
to impede the course of events” (written reply from 
the Federal Criminal Police Office, 2020). According to 
the Federal Police Act, a substantial threat to public 
security applies, for example, when a significant object 
of legal protection, such as the continued existence 
of the state, life, health or freedom, is under threat or 
substantial assets or other legal assets of substantial 
importance to the public which are protected under 
criminal law are at risk (Section 14 subs. 4 of the Fede
ral Police Act). 
-
-
-
The Residence Act stipulates various measures which 
can be undertaken when a person constitutes a threat 
to public security. In this connection, there are also 
legal stipulations defining what facts are considered 
to constitute a threat to the above-stated objects of 
legal protection (see Chapter 5 regarding the corres
ponding measures under the law on foreigners). Sec
tion 53 subs. 1 of the Residence Act stipulates that 
persons who endanger public security and order, the 
free democratic basic order or any other significant in
terests of the Federal Republic of Germany are to be 
expelled14. Expulsion on grounds of a threat to public 
security “also comes into consideration, for example, 
in case of a sufficient suspicion of serious offences, re
gardless of whether any criminal conviction has taken 
place to date” (55.1.1.1 of the General Administrative 
Regulation to the Residence Act). 
-
-
-
-
A threat to the free democratic basic order or the 
security of the Federal Republic of Germany is to be 
assumed pursuant to Section 54 subs. 1 no. 2 of the 
-
Residence Act where facts justify the conclusion that 
the person concerned belongs to or has belonged to 
an organisation which supports terrorism, or is prepa
ring or has prepared a serious violent offence endan
gering the state pursuant to Section 89a subs. 1 
second sentence of the Penal Code15. Section 92 subs. 
3 no. 2 of the Penal Code defines activities directed 
against the security of the Federal Republic of Ger
many as activities by persons working towards under
mining the external or internal security of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
-
-
-
-
In a judgement of 22 August 2017, the Federal Admi
nistrative Court found that, in addition to a concrete 
threat, a threat also applies when it exists in “adequa
tely concrete form” (Federal Administrative Court, jud
gement of 22 August 2017, marginal note 2616). This 
means that a removal order may also be issued against 
a person pursuant to Section 58a of the Residence Act 
where the threat which they pose to the security or of 
the Federal Republic of Germany or the terrorist threat 
which they constitute is not yet of a concrete nature. 
“With regard to terrorist offences [...], this may be the 
case where [...] although no incident is foreseeable as 
yet, a person’s individual behaviour constitutes a con
crete probability of their committing such offences in 
the foreseeable future” (Federal Administrative Court, 
judgement of 22 August 2017, marginal note 26).
-
-
-
-
14 “Expulsion (Sections 53-56 of the Residence Act) is [...] not an 
actual action, but an administrative act which ends the legality 
of a stay and gives rise to an obligation to leave the federal 
territory. Expulsion is ordered against foreigners who constitute 
a threat to order and security or the interests of the Federal 
Republic of Germany” (Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik 2017: 19).
15 A serious violent offence endangering the state is an offence 
against life in the case of Section 211 (Murder) or Section 212 
(Homicide) or against personal freedom in the cases covered by 
Section 239a (Abduction for purpose of extortion) or Section 
239 b (Hostage-taking) of the Penal Code which, by virtue of the 
circumstances concerned, is intended and appropriate to com
promise the continued existence or the security of a state or of 
an international organisation or to eliminate, nullify or undermi
ne constitutional principles of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Section 89a subs. 1 second sentence of the Penal Code).
16 Federal Administrative Court, judgement of 22.08.2017 – 1 A 
3.17 [ECLI:DE:BVerwG:2017:220817U1A3.17.0] – BeckRS 2017, 
127231 marginal note 26.
2.1.6 Politically motivated crime (PMC)
In addition to the above-stated terms, the definition of 
‘politically motivated crime’ is also of relevance to this 
study. Politically motivated crime comprises “criminal 
offences which are committed as a result of a politi
cal motivation” (BMI 2018a: 2). These are firstly such 
offences as are directed against the constitution, the 
continued existence of the state or its internal and/or 
external security, and secondly offences belonging to 
the category of general crime, where facts justify the 
assumption that the offender was pursuing certain 
politically motivated aims in committing the crime 
-
-
-
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(see Info box 1) Criminal offences are distinguished 
according to the categories ‘PMC -right-wing-’, ‘PMC 
-left-wing-’, ‘PMC -foreign ideology-’, ‘PMC -religious 
ideology-’17 and ‘PMC -not classifiable-‘ (BMI 2018a: 2). 
Persons who commit criminal offences in the area of 
politically motivated crime may thus be considered a 
threat to public security and order.
Islamist criminal offences in particular are recorded 
under PMC -religious ideology-. The area of PMC -for
eign ideology- includes criminal offences committed 
by persons with links to groups which are classified 
as extremist, such as the banned Kurdistan Worker’s 
Party (‘Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan’ – PKK)18 and their 
affiliated (sub-)organisations, such as the so-called 
People’s Defence Forces ‘Hêzên Parastina Gel’ (HPG), 
the ‘Democratic Union Party’ (PYD), the ‘People’s De
fence Units’ (YPG/YPJ) and the right-wing extremist 
Turkish Ülkücü movement19, which is also known as 
the ‘Grey Wolves’ and is under observation by the in
telligence services. The Federal Criminal Police Office 
is also aware of a small number of cases running into 
double figures in connection with the Turkish ‘Revo
lutionary People‘s Liberation Party/Front’ (DHKP/C) 
and the ‘Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist–Leninist’ 
(‘Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist-Leninist’ – TKP/
ML) (written reply from the Federal Criminal Police 
Office, 2020). Third-country nationals may also com
mit criminal offences in the areas of PMC -right-wing-
and PMC -left-wing- which are not perpetrated in 
connection with right- or left-wing extremist ideolo
gies from abroad.
-
-
-
-
-
-
17 The categories ‘PMC -foreign ideology-’ and ‘PMC -religious 
ideology-’ were derived in 2017 from the former category ‘PMC 
-foreigners crime-’. Within the former category ‘PMC -foreigners 
crime-’, offences which are now classified under ‘PMC -religious 
ideology-’ were registered under “Islamism/fundamentalism” 
(BMI 2018a: 2).
18 The PKK was founded in Turkey in 1978 with the aim of “estab
lishing an independent Kurdish state along socialist lines”. It has 
been listed as a terrorist organisation by the European Union 
since 2002 and in Germany it “continues to be by far the largest 
non-Islamist extremist organisation of foreigners, with a mem
bership of some 14,500” (Federal Office for the Protection of 
the Constitution (BfV) 2019: 5f).
19 The Ülkücü movement has existed in Turkey for more than 50 
years and has also been present in Germany for some decades. 
Its membership in Germany is estimated at 18,000 (Bozay 2017). 
“Racism, in particular hostility towards Jews and Israel, is an 
essential element of the Ülkücü movement’s Turkish right-wing 
extremist ideology” (Deutscher Bundestag 2018a: 3).
-
-
Info box 1: Politically motivated crime
“What is politically motivated crime?
The following are designated and recorded as 
politically motivated crime:
1.  
All criminal offences, any elements of which 
constitute crimes against the state, regardless of 
whether any political motivation is ascertainable 
in the individual case concerned. These include 
propaganda crimes (Sections 86, 86a of the Penal 
Code), forming a terrorist organisation (Section 
129a of the Penal Code) and high treason (Sections 
81, 82 of the Penal Code).
2.  
Criminal offences committed in the area of general 
crime (such as homicide, bodily harm, arson, resis
tance to state authority, criminal damage), where an 
assessment of the overall circumstances pertaining 
to the offence and/or the offender’s mindset provide 
an indication that they:
-
● are intended to influence the democratic 
decision-making process, to serve the attain
ment or obstruction of political objectives or 
are aimed at preventing the implementation of 
political decisions,
● are directed against the free and democratic 
basic order or one of its essential characteristics, 
against the continued existence or security of 
the Federation or a Land or are intended to un
lawfully hinder members of the constitutional 
bodies of the Federation or a Land from dischar
ging their official duties,
● jeopardise foreign interests of the Federal 
Republic of Germany through the use of violence 
or preparations for the same,
● are directed against a person on account of their 
political views, nationality, ethnicity, race20, skin 
colour, religion, ideology, origin or due to their 
appearance, disablement, sexual orientation or 
social status (so-called hate crime)” BMI n. d.).
-
-
-
20 The term “race” is used by reference to the Geneva 
Convention on Human Rights – author’s note.
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Organised crime
So-called clan crime21 in the area of organised crime 
is also discussed frequently in the debate on secu
rity and aspects of residence law. A “coordinated ap
proach to combating ‘clan crime’, to be jointly pursued 
by all the Länder”, was agreed at the 210th meeting 
of the Standing Conference of Interior Ministers and 
Senators (IMK) in June 2019. It was further resolved 
that “in extreme, isolated cases [...] links to interna
tional terrorism” exist and clan crime must be com
bated “across the board as a matter of priority” (IMK 
2019: 19). At present, the Federal Criminal Police Of
fice does not have any evidence of any “established 
structures” between “(international) organised crime” 
and third-country nationals who constitute a threat to 
public security. However, the Federal Criminal Police 
Office “cannot rule out the possibility that potential 
perpetrators from the field of Islamist-motivated ter
rorism/extremism could, in isolated instances, exploit 
the opportunities in particular to procure resources 
in the area of organised crime by specifically establi
shing contacts or using existing contacts in this milieu 
(written reply from the Federal Criminal Police Office, 
2020).
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
21 “Clan crime” refers to the “perpetration of criminal offences by 
members of ethnically isolated sub-cultures”. The term ‘clan 
crime’ does not constitute a legal definition (BKA 2019a: 29).
2.1.7 Potential offenders and persons 
of interest
In the area of averting threats to public security, the 
competent police authorities can also classify indivi
duals as ‘potential offenders’ (Gefährderinnen/Gefähr
der) or ‘persons of interest’ (relevante Personen) (BKA 
2020). ‘Potential offender’ is a “working term emplo
yed by the security services particularly in the context 
of fighting terrorism” (Deutscher Bundestag 2017a: 3). 
According to the definition adopted by the association 
of Federal Criminal Police Office and the Land criminal 
police offices, a “potential offender” is “a person for 
whom specific facts justify the assumption that they 
will commit politically motivated criminal offences 
of substantial significance, in particular such offen
ces pursuant to Section 100a of the ‘Code of Crimi
nal Procedure’” (Deutscher Bundestag 2017a: 3). This 
concerns “serious criminal offences” covering vari
ous fields of law, such as the Criminal Code (including 
the crimes of offences against peace, high treason and 
endangering democratic state rule, treason and endan
gering external security, offences against public order, 
murder and manslaughter), the Asylum Act (including 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
incitement to submit fraudulent applications for asy
lum), the Residence Act (including smuggling foreign 
persons), the War Weapons Control Act or the Code of 
Crimes Against International Law (including genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes) (Section 100a 
para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).
-
In contrast to classification as a ‘potential offender’, 
an individual is to be considered a ‘person of interest’ 
“when they have the role of (a) a leader, (b) a suppor
ter/logistician, (c) an actor within the extremist/terro
rist spectrum and where there are objective indications 
that they promote, support, commit or are involved 
in politically motivated criminal offences of substan
tial significance, in particular such offences pursuant 
to Section 100a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or 
(d) if they are a contact or accomplice of an individual 
classified as a potential offender, a person accused or 
suspected of having committed a politically motivated 
criminal offence of substantial significance, in parti
cular such an offence pursuant to Section 100a of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure (BKA 2020a). In contrast to 
the PMC categories, which concern criminal offences 
that have already been committed, potential offenders 
or persons of interest must not necessarily have com
mitted politically motivated crimes in order to be clas
sified as such.
-
-
-
-
-
-
The classification of individuals as potential offenders 
or persons of interest generally takes place by the lo
cally competent police authorities of the respective 
Länder (Deutscher Bundestag 2017b: 2). In addition, 
Section 4a of the Federal Criminal Police Act also per
mits the Federal Criminal Police to draw up its own list 
of potential offenders and persons of interest (Deut
scher Bundestag 2017b: 6). Assessment as to whether 
a person will commit politically motivated criminal of
fences pursuant to Section 100a of the Code of Crimi
nal Procedure “is always dependent on the individual 
case concerned. Assessment takes place [...] by way of 
an individual coordinated appraisal process” (Land
tag Brandenburg 2017: 2). Accordingly, persons who 
commit politically motivated criminal offences are not 
automatically classified. Equally, they must not neces
sarily have been classified as potential offenders or 
persons of interest in order to constitute a threat to 
public security.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Classification as a potential offender or person 
of interest
In connection with the various Islamist attacks in 
Europe, in recent years resources have been invested 
above all in assessing dangers in the area of Islamist 
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extremism and terrorism. With regard to Islamist 
extremism and terrorism, the police have “three stan
dardised classification systems which pursue different 
objectives” at their disposal: 
-
1. “Eight-stage forecasting model: When facts and 
circumstances become known which indicate a 
concrete damaging event, such as a plan to stage 
an attack by persons previously unknown to the 
police, an eight-stage forecasting model is applied 
to assess the probability of the potential dama
ging event actually occurring.
2. Classification as a potential offender: When cer
tain facts justify the assumption that a person will 
participate in varying ways in politically motivated 
criminal offences or that a person plays a specific 
role in the scene, classification as a potential of
fender or a person of interest takes place, leading 
to police and/or penal measures.
3. RADAR-iTE (rule-based analysis of potentially 
destructive offenders to assess the acute risk – 
Islamist terrorism): With RADAR-iTE, a person 
about whom a minimum scope of information  
relating to events from their life is available un
dergoes an assessment of the risk they pose of 
committing a serious act of violence in Germany 
and is rated according to a scale of risks in order 
to subsequently prioritise intervention measures.” 
This is intended to enable a “standard nationwide 
system of assessment” (BKA 2017). 
-
-
-
-
RADAR-iTE was developed by the Federal Criminal 
Police Office in cooperation with the Forensic Psycho
logy work group at the University of Konstanz (BKA 
2017). By reference to a risk assessment questionnaire 
containing standardised questions and answers and 
covering a total of 73 characteristics in seven subject 
areas, a regulated procedure is applied to classify the 
individual concerned according to a three-stage scale 
of risks (high, manifest, moderate risk). This proce
dure is carried out using information which is already 
available to the police authorities on the basis of exis
ting legal provisions or information which they are 
permitted to collect. “The characteristics relate, for 
example, to previously committed violent crimes, ex
perience with weapons or explosives, integration in 
the radical scene, time spent in war zones, participa
tion in fighting there and aspects of a problematic per
sonality, such as diagnosed psychological disorders” 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2017c: 7). As a general rule, the 
assessment is carried out by the competent Land po
lice. The result of the assessment and the information 
forming the basis for the assessment are forwarded to 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
the Federal Criminal Police Office, which then under
takes a quality assurance check. High-risk persons are 
always subjected to individual case assessment and 
are dealt with in the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre 
(Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum, GTAZ) 
work group Risk Management (Chapter 3.1.1), in 
which the relevant security services participate (writ
ten reply from the Federal Criminal Police Office, 
2020). RADAR-iTE offers the authorities relevant ini
tial information on and assessments of the individuals 
concerned, on the basis of which the security services 
can prioritise appropriate measures (BKA 2017).
-
-
-
Building on this, a joint project is currently being car
ried out (August 2017 to January 2020) by the Federal 
Criminal Police Office, the Police Training College of 
Saxony-Anhalt, the University of Konstanz, the Land 
Criminal Police Office of North-Rhine Westphalia and 
the Austrian Office for the Protection of the Constitu
tion and Counterterrorism (BVT) as associated partner 
organisations to develop a further analysis system: the 
two-stage ‘risk-analysis system for Islamist-motivated 
potential perpetrators’ (‘RISKANT’). This analysis sys
tem is intended to be used solely for “radicalised Isla
mist persons who have already come to the attention 
of the police”. The first stage entails “a risk assessment 
based on standardised questions”. In the following 
stage, “those persons who have been assessed as con
stituting a high risk” on the basis of the questions “are 
subjected to individual in-depth examination (BMBF 
2020).
-
-
-
-
-
Holger Münch, president of the Federal Criminal 
Police Office, stated in an interview in 2019 that the 
focus on Islamist terrorism in recent years meant that 
the German security services had not addressed the 
area of PMC -right-wing- with the “same intensity” 
(BKA 2019b). In view of the “increase in right-wing  
violence, as well as hate and agitation on the inter
net”, the Federal Criminal Police Office sees a need 
to invest greater resources in combatting the area of 
PMC -right-wing-, however. In this connection, it has 
announced that it will be applying the RADAR risk as
sessment system to the area of PMC -right-wing- in a 
two-year project (March 2020 to February 2022). There 
are no plans at present to introduce RADAR for the 
areas of PMC -left-wing- and PMC -foreign ideology- 
(BKA 2019b, written reply from the Federal Criminal 
Police Office, 2020).
-
-
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2.1.8 Radicalisation
The term ‘radicalisation’ is not defined in law and 
there is no standard official definition applied by 
all government bodies. The term ‘radicalisation’ has 
drawn “fundamental” criticism in some instances, on 
account of its “normativity”, its “subjectivity”, its “stig
matising potential and the individuality of personal 
change processes” (Beratungsstelle “Radikalisierung” 
2018: 5). The various individuals involved in this area 
focus on “different aspects of radicalisation” accor
ding to their respective “mandate and self-perception” 
as “formed by their professional outlook” (Uhlmann 
2017: 20). 
-
-
By way of example, the counselling centres network of 
the “Radicalisation” counselling centre at the Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees defines “radicalisa
tion” as “a complex, generally non-linear, individual, 
often but not exclusively group-related process of ad
opting an extremist mindset and corresponding beha
viour” (Beratungsstelle „Radikalisierung“ 2018: 5). This 
process is often accompanied by a “growing willing
ness to advocate, support and/or apply non-democra
tic means, culminating in the use of violence, in order 
to achieve political, social and/or religious objectives 
(Beratungsstelle “Radikalisierung” 2018: 5). 
-
-
-
-
-
At the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (GTAZ)22, radi
calisation is defined as a “growing shift among people 
or groups towards an extremist mindset and corres
ponding behaviour and an increasing willingness to 
advocate, support and/or apply illegitimate means, 
culminating in the use of violence, in order to achieve 
their objectives.” It sees “radicalisation” as “often an 
insidious process” resulting from “an interplay of indi
vidual experiences, contact with extremist scenes and 
the consumption of propaganda” (written reply from 
BKA, 2020).
-
-
-
22 The GTAZ is a cooperation and communication platform of the 
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), the 
Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), the Federal Intelligence 
Service (BND), the Federal Public Prosecutor, the federal police, 
the Customs Investigation Bureau (ZKA), the Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees, the Military Counter-Intelligence 
Service (MAD), the Land Offices for the Protection of the Cons
titution and the Land Criminal Police Offices to counter Islamist 
terrorism. See Chapter 3.
-
2.1.9 Extremism
As with radicalisation, there is equally no legal defini
tion of the term “extremism” in Germany. According to 
case law, however, it can be stated on the whole that 
“the essential, defining characteristic of extremism is 
that it is at odds with the free democratic basic order 
pursuant to the Basic Law” (Deutscher Bundestag 
2018b: 4).
-
The counselling centres network of the “Radicalisa
tion” counselling centre at the Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees defines the term ‘extremism’ 
as one of the “ideologised mindsets and behavioural 
patterns which is contrary to human rights, the para
mount principles of democracy and the fundamental 
principles of the constitution. These relate to the 
inviolable democratic constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, as set down in the Basic Law 
and condensed in the term ‘free democratic basic 
order’. While extremist mindsets and behaviour may 
be related to violence, this must no necessarily be the 
case” (Beratungsstelle “Radikalisierung” 2018: 5).
-
-
The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitu
tion defines as “extremist” activities which “are aimed 
at eliminating the fundamental values of liberal demo
cracy” (BfV 2020a). Reference is sometimes also made 
to “violence-oriented” or “violent extremism” (BMI 
2018b). At the GTAZ, “violent extremism” is defined as 
“endeavours to overcome the system which are direc
ted against the free and democratic basic order, inclu
ding the use of violence (written reply from the Fede
ral Criminal Police Office, 2020). Criminal offences “for 
which there are actual indications that they are direc
ted against the free democratic basic order, that is, at 
eliminating or nullifying one of the following constitu
tional principles, are classified as extremist crime:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
 The right of the people to exercise state authority 
in elections and ballots and through special legis
lative bodies and institutions of executive power 
and jurisdiction, and to elect the representation of 
the people in general, direct, free, equal and secret 
ballots.
-
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 The binding of legislative power to the constituti
onal order and the binding of executive power and 
jurisdiction to justice and the law.
 The right to establish and pursue parliamentary 
opposition.
 The removability of the government and its 
accountability parliament.
 The independence of the courts.
 The exclusion of any form of tyranny or arbitrary 
rule.
 The human rights specified in the Basic Law.
-
Criminal offices which jeopardise foreign interests of 
the Federal Republic of Germany through the use of 
violence or preparations for the same or are directed 
against peaceful relations between nations are also 
classified as extremist crime” (written reply from the 
Federal Criminal Police Office, 2020).
There is no specific definition of violent extremism in 
relation to a threat to public security, the security of 
the Federal Republic of Germany or the free and de
mocratic basic order. In accordance with Section 53 
subs. 1 no. 2 of the Residence Act, a person is to be  
regarded as a threat to the free democratic basic order 
and/or the security of the Federal Republic of Ger
many where facts justify the conclusion that they 
belong to or support an organisation which supports 
terrorism or that they are preparing a serious vio
lent offence endangering the state23. Criminal offen
ces with extremist motives, that is, such offences as 
are aimed at eliminating the constitutional principles 
which are vital to the free democratic basic order, are 
also classified as belonging to the area of politically 
motivated crime (BMI 2018: 24). The extent to which 
a person constitutes a threat to public security, the 
security of the Federal Republic of Germany or the 
free and democratic basic order as a result of extremist 
activities must be determined on the basis of the indi
vidual case concerned.
-
-
-
-
-
23 A serious violent offence endangering the state is an offence 
against life in the case of Section 211 (Murder) or Section 212 
(Homicide) or against personal freedom in the cases covered by 
Section 239a (Abduction for purpose of extortion) or Section 
239 b (Hostage-taking) of the Penal Code which, by virtue of the 
circumstances concerned, is intended and appropriate to com
promise the continued existence or the security of a state or of 
an international organisation or to eliminate, nullify or undermi
ne constitutional principles of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Section 89a subs. 1 second sentence of the Penal Code).
-
-
2.2 Statistics on politically 
motivated crime, potential 
offenders and persons of 
interest
This sub-chapter presents statistics on politically mo
tivated crime, potential offenders and persons of inter
est. To facilitate a clearer understanding in the general 
context, the overall statistics are first of all presented 
in the respective categories, followed by a differentia
tion according to third-country nationals. The statistics 
on PMC (Figure 1) take the form of incoming statistics 
and comprise the number of criminal offences “com
mitted on the basis of a political motivation” (BMI 
2019a: 2; Chapter 2.1.6). Offences which fall into the 
category of politically motivated crime are registered 
by the Criminal Police Offices of the Länder as part 
of the ‘criminal police alert service for politically mo
tivated crime’ and forwarded to the Federal Criminal 
Police Office. These take the form of so-called ‘incom
ing statistics’, whereby committed offences are regis
tered at the time when an offence is reported or crim
inal investigations are initiated. “The aggrieved party’s 
point of view” is also to be considered in assessing the 
offence. Where the political background to a crimi
nal offence only becomes apparent at a later juncture 
(i.e. in the course of investigations or court proceed
ings), this must be subsequently reported. “In prac
tice”, it is “not rare” for this subsequent reporting to 
be neglected, however. The fact that only reported of
fences are included in the statistics means that there 
are a large number of undisclosed cases, the scale 
of which varies according to the type of phenome
non concerned. A particularly large number of unre
ported cases is to be assumed above all in the area of 
crime motivated by right-wing extremism, for exam
ple (Staud 2018). In addition to the police statistics, 
there are also statistics from civil society – from vic
tim counselling centres, for example, which commonly 
“register markedly more incidents than the authori
ties,” because victims often wish to avoid contact with 
authorities (Staud 2018).
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
In contrast to the statistics on persons classified as 
potential offenders and persons of interest (Table 1), 
these statistics thus relate to criminal offences in the 
area of PMC which have actually been committed. 
Persons classified as potential offenders must not nec
essarily have committed politically motivated criminal 
offences in order to be classified as such, however.
-
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Figure 1: Development of total number of criminal offences by PMC category (2008-2018)
Table 1: Number of potential offenders and persons of interest in Germany (as per 30 November 2019)
Potential 
offenders Persons of interest
1)
Total Total Leaders Supporters/logisticians Actors
Contacts/
accomplices
No informa
tion provided/
available
-
PMC -total- 2), 3) 752 778 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
PMC -right-
wing-
46 126 41 22 66 40 -
PMC -left-wing- 5 85 23 6 70 0 -
PMC -foreign 
ideology-
21 48 12 10 19 5 11
PMC -religious 
ideology-
679 517 45 141 102 137 -
Source: Deutscher Bundestag 2019a: 5.
1) Several roles are allocated in some instances. 
2) All categories, including PMC -not classifiable-. 
3) This table lists only those cases which are known to the federal authorities, as the Länder are responsible for dealing with potential offenders. 
The figures also vary on a daily basis as a result of new classifications, declassifications and reclassifications (Deutscher Bundestag 2019a: 4).
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The discrepancy between the criminal offences re
corded in the PMC statistics and the list of potential 
offenders, in particular with regard to PMC -right-
wing- and PMC -religious ideology-, has been a sub
ject of discussion in political and government circles 
for some time now. As Table 1 shows, as per Novem
ber 2019, 679 persons were classified as potential of
fenders in the area of PMC -religious ideology- while 
the corresponding number in the area of PMC -right-
wing- stood at 46. This represents a stark contrast to 
the crimes recorded in the PMC statistics according to 
PMC categories. In 2018, 20,431 right-wing and 586 
religiously motivated crimes were recorded (Figure 1). 
The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitu
tion puts the number of right-wing extremists at ap
prox. 25,350 in 2018 and assumes that half of these 
are violence-oriented24 (12,700, BMI 2019b: 50). An 
orientation towards violence does not mean that these 
persons are also prepared to use violence and that it 
is to be assumed that these people intend to carry out 
attacks, however (Götschenberg/Schmidt 2019). An 
orientation towards violence and a preparedness to 
carry out attacks would mean that these people would 
be classifiable as potential offenders. On the basis of 
12,700 right-wing extremists classified as violence-
oriented, the Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution and the Federal Criminal Police Office 
assume that the number of right-wing extremists clas
sified as potential offenders is too low, and have each 
announced plans for more detailed monitoring and 
counter-active measures in this area (Götschenberg/
Schmit 2019). 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
The statistics on potential offenders are broken down 
in part according to nationality and residence permits. 
A response by the Federal Government to a question 
from the party The Left (Die Linke) regarding the nati
onalities of potential offenders and persons of interest 
who are assignable to the PMC category of religious 
ideology reveals, for example, that of the total of 767 
potential offenders and 470 persons of interest as per 
7 November 2018 the share of German nationals was 
around 53%. Not all of these persons were resident in 
Germany, however (Deutscher Bundestag 2018c: 2f.). 
-
24 The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution uses 
the generic term ‘violence-oriented’ “where extremists can be 
classified as violent, potentially violent, supporters of violence or 
advocators of violence” (BMI 2019b: 19).
Table 2: Number of cases processed in the Status working 
group at the GTAZ involving persons from the Islamist 
category (as per 26 November 2019)
Nationality Potential offenders1)
Persons 
of interest1)
Total 225 126
Syria 94 37
Turkey 30 21
Russian Federation 20 15
Iraq 14 8
Unclarified 10 3
Tajikistan 7 4
Tunisia 6 5
Afghanistan 5 5
Bosnia and Herzegovina 5 2
Stateless 5 1
Algeria 3 0
Jordan 3 1
Kosovo 3 3
Morocco 3 3
Somalia 3 2
Libya 2 1
Pakistan 2 2
Serbia 2 1
Albania 1 1
France 1 1
Greece 1 0
Israel 1 0
Cameroon 1 0
Lebanon 1 2
North Macedonia 1 1
Romania 1 1
Belgium 0 1
India 0 1
Italy 0 3
Source: Deutscher Bundestag 2019a: 6ff.
1) This table lists only those cases which are known to the federal 
authorities, as the Länder are responsible for processing potential 
offenders. The figures also vary on a daily basis as a result of new 
classifications, declassifications and reclassifications (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2019a: 4).
20 Threat to public security: national context and definitions
Table 2 shows the number of cases involving poten
tial offenders and persons of interest which have been 
dealt with in the so-called ‘Status-Related Accompa
nying Measures’ working group (Status) focusing on 
accompanying measures relating to the legal status of 
foreign nationals at the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre 
(GTAZ; Chapter 3.1.1) (as per 26 November 2019). The 
Status working group is tasked here with “the timely 
identification of persons with an extremist Islamist or 
terrorist Islamist background who may constitute sui
table subjects for measures under the law as applies 
to foreigners, asylum and nationality in the interests of 
averting a threat to public security” (Deutscher Bun
destag 2014a: 10). The Status working group is concer
ned solely with foreign nationals in the area of Islamist 
terrorism. German Islamist potential offenders (except 
where they hold an additional nationality in addition 
to their German nationality) and foreign potential of
fenders who do not fall into this category are conse
quently not included in these statistics. Cases are also 
processed in which persons are classified neither as 
potential offenders nor as persons of interest, howe
ver, as such classification may not (yet) have been car
ried out. In all, 677 cases involving individuals from the 
Islamist category were being processed by 26 Novem
ber 2019, including 225 potential offenders and 126 
persons of interest. This means that, of the 677 cases 
processed, 326 persons had not (yet) been classified as 
potential offenders or persons of interest.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
As Table 2 reveals, the largest numbers of potential 
offenders who have been processed in the Status wor
king group are Syrian, Turkish and Russian nationals. 
EU nationals are also included in the Status working 
group’s statistics (Belgium, France and Greece), 
although substantially smaller numbers of cases are 
involved here.
-
Table 3 shows the residence status of potential offen
ders and persons of interest from the Islamist cate
gory of cases involving persons with an asylum back
ground processed in the Status working group (as per 
26 November 2019). It can be seen here that of the 42 
potential offenders who held refugee status, the revo
cation procedure was pending regarding the refugee 
status of 32 persons. The revocation procedure was 
pending for 15 of the 22 cases relating to persons of 
interest. The revocation procedure was in progress 
for seven of the twelve potential offenders who were 
entitled to subsidiary protection. Among the persons 
of interest, the corresponding figure was two out of 
13 cases.
-
-
-
-
Table 3: Residence status of cases processed in the Status working group at the GTAZ involving persons from the Islamist 
category with an asylum background (as per 26 November 2019)
Potential offenders1) Persons of interest1)
Total
Of which, 
revocation 
procedure 
pending
Legal actions 
pending 
following 
revocation
Total
Of which, 
revocation 
procedure 
pending
Legal actions 
pending 
following 
revocation
Persons entitled 
to asylum
0 - - 1 - 1
Refugee status 42 32 - 22 15 -
Beneficiaries 
of subsidiary 
protection
12 7 - 13 2 -
Source: Deutscher Bundestag 2019a: 9f.
1) This table lists only those cases which are known to the federal authorities, as the Länder are responsible for processing potential offen
ders. The figures also vary on a daily basis as a result of new classifications, declassifications and reclassifications (Deutscher Bundestag 
2019a: 4).
-
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2.3 Political debate
The question as to how persons who constitute a 
threat to public security are to be dealt with has be
come a subject of large-scale political and public 
debate in recent years. This is attributable to the incre
ased number of Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe, 
including Germany, since 2014 and the growing num
ber of supporters of so-called ‘Islamic State’ (IS)25 
returning from Syria and Iraq. In addition, the expo
sure of attacks by the National Socialist Underground 
(NSU)26 and the subsequent prosecutions, as well as 
various other right-wing terrorist attacks and new or
ganisations which have emerged in recent years have 
played an important role (including ‘Revolution Chem
nitz’27; the murder of Walter Lübcke28, a regional chief 
administrator in Hesse, in 2019; attack on a syna
gogue and a kebab restaurant in Halle in 201929). 
These attacks led to the introduction of repressive 
measures (through the amendment of the Residence 
Act, for example), while at the same time increased 
attention was directed to prevention measures aimed 
at the timely prevention of such dangers. The Federal 
Ministry of the Interior refers in this context to an “in
tegral approach” combining repressive measures with 
measures aimed at prevention and deradicalisation 
(BMI 2020b; see Chapter 4.3 in the context of the 
‘Federal Government strategy to prevent extremism 
and promote democracy’).
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
25 Politicians and the media sometimes also call the terrorist orga
nisation “Daesh” or “Daish”, as for many people the term “state” 
“unnecessarily enhances the terrorist organisation’s status” and 
the word “Islamic” upsets “many Muslims, who criticise the 
fact that it equates their religion with the terrorists” (Deutsch
landfunk, 2015). The word “Daesh” derives from the acronym 
of the Arab designation for the terrorist organisation (“Al-daula 
al-Islamija fi-l-Iraq wa-l-Scham”, which is “used in a pejorative 
sense” and “evokes other Arab terms which translate roughly as 
“to breed discord” or “to crush underfoot” (Schulte von Drach 
2015).
26 At the end of 2011 it became known that the so-called National 
Socialist Underground (NSU), an extreme right-wing terrorist 
group, was responsible for ten murders, a number of bomb at
tacks and various bank robberies in Germany (BpB 2013; EMN/
BAMF 2018: 77).
27 The purportedly right-wing terrorist organisation ‘Revolution 
Chemnitz’ allegedly “planned to overthrow the democratic order 
with weapons” (Jüttner 2019). The Federal Public Prosecutor’s 
Office has brought charges against the eight suspected mem
bers. The criminal proceedings were still in progress at the time 
of completion of this study.
28 Walter Lübcke, a regional chief administrator in Hesse, was shot 
dead on 2 June 2019. In view of the main suspect, the Federal 
Public Prosecutor’s Office assumes a “right-wing extremist 
background to the crime” (Zeit Online 2019).
29 On 9 October 2019 the suspected right-wing extremist attacker 
Stephan B. attempted to blow open the door to the synagogue 
in Halle with an explosive device, in order to stage a massacre 
inside. Two people died and several were injured (Strack 2019).
-
-
-
-
Attack on the Christmas Market at Berlinʼs 
Breitscheidplatz (2016)
On December 19, 2016, a terrorist attack was carried 
out on a Christmas market at the Breitscheidplatz in 
Berlin (BMI 2018c).30 Twelve people died and more 
than 70 people were injured when the Tunisian assas
sin Anis Amri drove a lorry into the Christmas market. 
Amri was an asylum applicant who had used several 
different names to file asylum applications at a num
ber of places in Germany since July 2015. Before, he 
had already applied for asylum in Italy. In Germany, 
several investigations against Amri were underway, 
and he had been temporarily in custody to secure his 
departure. However, it was impossible to remove him 
because he lacked passport substitutes (Schneider 
2017). 
-
-
The attack fuelled a debate about security gaps con
cerning potential terrorists or islamist criminals among 
refugees, which had already started in 2016. This led to 
changes in administrative practice, a more restrictive 
asylum law and measures to facilitate forced returns. 
In terms of administrative practice, already in 2016 the 
introduction of a core database allowed to introduce 
additional measures in order to unveil multiple regis
trations of asylum seekers. Asylum and residence law 
provisions were tightened by the ‘Act to Improve the 
Enforcement of the Obligation to Leave the Country’, 
which entered into force on 29 July 2017. With this, 
the possibility of detention for people who pose a 
threat to public security has been expanded. The 
monitoring for persons who are obliged to leave the 
country (electronic ankle cuffs, restriction of the area 
of residence) were also tightened (Deutscher Bundes
tag 2017d: 21162). 
-
-
-
The creation of the Repatriation Support Centre (ZUR) 
was one measure to facilitate removals; the Centre 
helps to coordinate the operative efforts of the Fe
deral and Land authorities, including in the area of 
forced returns (EMN/BAMF 2018: 26f.). Amri had been 
classified as a potential offender by the authorities in 
North Rhine-Westphalia in February 2016 and by the 
authorities in Berlin in March 2016 and had thus been 
discussed several times at the meetings of the Joint 
Counter-Terrorism Centre (GTAZ). It proved impossible 
to remove him from Germany, because the competent 
foreigners authority was unable to obtain the neces
sary documentation from the Tunisian authorities (BMI 
2017a: 6ff.). 
-
-
30 This section is based on the EMN/BAMF Policy Report 2017 
(EMN/BAMF 2018: 26f.).
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On an operational level, the Federal Criminal Police 
Office was tasked among other things with improving 
the risk assessment of violent criminals and standardi
sing the assessment of potential offenders. In addi
tion, further efforts were to be undertaken to improve 
the exchange of intelligence within Europe (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2017d: 21162). This was done in light of the 
fact that in the case of Anis Amri the Italian authori
ties failed to inform the German authorities that his 
asylum application had been rejected in Italy and that 
he had a criminal record there. Similarly, Amri’s finger
prints had not been stored in the European Dactylo
scopy fingerprint identification system (EURODAC) 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2017e: 21173). The then fede
ral minister of the interior also announced that there 
would be “an increased focus on including other policy 
fields, in particular the areas of foreign, economic and 
development policy, in negotiations with countries of 
origin on taking back their own nationals” (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2017d: 21162). It was also decided that “in 
cases in which a foreign Islamist potential offender 
could not be successfully prosecuted under criminal 
law, their removal was to be pursued as a matter of 
priority” (Deutscher Bundestag 2019b; Chapter 5.4).
-
-
-
-
-
-
In the debate on the attack at Breitscheidplatz, the  
Federal Ministry of Justice also stressed the high im
portance of prevention work: “No-one believes that 
we can manage this solely through repressive means. 
It is not sufficient to place potential offenders under 
surveillance or to punish offenders. But this does need 
to happen: We need to make every effort in the area of 
prevention, because we must prevent people who have 
come here, and also those who originate from here – 
as not all potential offenders hold a foreign passport – 
from becoming radicalised in our country and drifting 
into radical Islamism” (Deutscher Bundestag 2017f: 
21165). One example of initiatives in the area of pre
ventive measures is the federal democracy-promotion 
programme ‘Demokratie leben!’, which was launched 
back in 2015 to promote projects aimed at preven
ting radicalisation and promoting democracy (BMFSFJ 
2020; Chapter 4.3 ). The ‘Federal Government strategy 
to prevent extremism and promote democracy’ 
(Bundesregierung 2016) was also adopted back in 2016 
(Chapter 4.3). The ‘National prevention programme 
against Islamist extremism’ (NPP), which was adopted 
in 2017 in the wake of the attack on Breitscheidplatz, 
“builds on the Federal Government’s existing preven
tion measures” (BMI 2017b, Chapter 4.1).
-
-
-
-
The opposition, first and foremost the party The Left, 
criticised the approach by the German security servi
ces and foreigners authorities and called for investi
gations by a committee of enquiry. It was questioned 
-
-
whether the planned repressive amendments to the 
law could actually prevent future attacks, as in the cri
tics’ view the attack by Amri resulted primarily from 
misjudgements by the German authorities, rather than 
the absence of appropriate laws (Deutscher Bundes
tag 2017g: 21163). Similar criticism was voiced by the 
representatives from Alliance 90/The Greens (Bünd
nis 90/Die Grünen), the Free Democratic Party (Freie 
Demokratische Partei, FDP) and The Left (Die Linke) of 
the Breitscheidplatz committee of enquiry (ZDF 2019).
-
-
-
IS returnees
A major security debate has also been in progress for 
a number of years now on the question of how to deal 
with German nationals, with and without a migrant 
background, and with foreign nationals and holders of 
dual citizenship who return to Germany after having 
joined the ‘Islamic State’ (IS). The ‘Third Act amending 
the Nationality Act’ entered into force on 9 August 
2019, introducing a new provision on the loss of 
German nationality. Under this provision, Germans 
who hold an additional nationality are to lose their 
citizenship if they take part in fighting for a terrorist 
organisation abroad (Section 17 subs. 1 no. 5 of the 
Nationality Act; Flade/Mascolo 2019). 
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3 The role of the migration authorities 
in the security context
This chapter considers the role of the migration au
thorities in the identification of, the exchange of infor
mation on and the handling of third-country nationals 
who constitute a threat to public security, and docu
ments the corresponding framework and administ
rative procedures. The Federal Office for Migration 
and Refugees is of primary importance here as, in ac
cordance with Section 75 no. 11 of the Residence Act, 
it is responsible for “coordinating the transfer of infor
mation and evaluating findings of the federal authori
ties, in particular of the Federal Criminal Police Office 
and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Con
stitution, on foreigners for whom measures under the 
law on foreigners, asylum or nationality must be con
sidered owing to a risk to public security”. The Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees is a federal autho
rity within the sphere of responsibility of the Fede
ral Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community 
which has its headquarters in Nuremberg and is addi
tionally represented at 66 additional locations throug
hout Germany. 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Alongside the Federal Office for Migration and Refu
gees, the foreigners authorities are competent at local 
level in the Länder for all residence- and passport-
related measures and rulings in accordance with the 
Residence Act and pursuant to provisions relating to 
foreigners in other laws (Section 71 subs. 1 first sen
tence of the Residence Act). As such, they also play a 
substantial role in enforcing residence-related mea
sures against third-country nationals who constitute a 
threat to public security.
-
-
-
3.1 At federal level: The role 
of the Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees
The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees has 
been responsible for coordinating the transfer of infor
mation and evaluating findings of the federal authori
ties (Section 75 no. 11 of the Residence Act) since the 
‘Act to Implement Residence- and Asylum-Related Di
rectives of the European Union’ entered into force on 
-
-
-
1 September 2008. The Federal Office for Migration 
and Refugees cooperates with the Federal Criminal 
Police Office and the Federal Office for the Protec
tion of the Constitution with the aim of “identifying in 
good time whether and what measures under the law 
on foreigners and asylum and measures to prevent 
naturalisation can be applied in specific cases” (Deut
scher Bundestag 2007: 194). To this end, in its capacity 
as a federal authority the Federal Office for Migration 
and Refugees compiles relevant findings, evaluates 
these and coordinates the forwarding of information 
to the competent federal and Land authorities31 (Deut
scher Bundestag 2007: 194). 
-
-
-
The assumption of this task by the Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees has received criticism from 
various quarters on the grounds that Section 75 no. 11 
of the Residence Act does not define this task of the 
Federal Office with sufficient clarity, given its far
reaching consequences with regard to residence issues. 
Critics cite the fact that there are no stipulations as 
to which items of information are to be forwarded to 
which authorities and which concrete measures come 
into consideration under the law as it relates to for
eigners, asylum and nationality matters (Clodius 2016: 
§ 75 AufenthG, marginal note 14).
-
-
In addition to this coordinating role, the Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees also forwards informa
tion to the security services relating to security aspects 
which is obtained in asylum hearings or with regard to 
beneficiaries of international protection in the revoca
tion procedure (Chapter 3.3.1).
-
-
31 Interior ministries, foreigners authorities and authorities 
concerned with matters of nationality.
3.1.1 Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (GTAZ)
The Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (Gemeinsames 
Terrorismusabwehrzentrum, GTAZ) was established 
on 14 December 2004 in response to the attacks in 
New York on 11 September 2001 (Deutscher Bundes
tag 2018: 5). The GTAZ operates in the field of “mo
nitoring and combating Islamist terrorism”. “To this 
-
-
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end, the security services are to work together so as 
to incorporate all available sources of intelligence, to 
improve the efficiency of information management, to 
strengthen analytical capacities, to identify potential 
threats at an early juncture and to facilitate the coor
dination of operational measures” (Deutscher Bundes
tag 2018d: 5). The GTAZ thus pools the expertise of 
the German security services. The Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees is also involved here, partici
pating in particular in the ‘Status-Related Accompany
ing Measures’ and ‘Deradicalisation’ working groups, 
where it is able to contribute its expertise in the fields 
of the law as it applies to foreigners and asylum and 
in the area of deradicalisation, in accordance with its 
legal mandate (Section 75 no. 11 of the Residence Act) 
(BAMF 2020a).
-
-
-
-
The following federal and Land authorities are repre
sented at the GTAZ:
-
 The Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution,
 the Federal Criminal Police Office,
 the Federal Intelligence Service,
 the Federal Public Prosecutor,
 the Federal Police,
 the Customs Criminological Office,
 the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees,
 the Federal Office for the Military Counter-
Intelligence Service,
 the Land Offices for the Protection of the 
Constitution
 and the Land Criminal Police Offices.
The GTAZ is divided up into various working groups 
(WG):
 WG ‘Daily Briefing’,
 WG ‘Threat Assessment’,
 WG ‘Operational Exchange of Information’,
 WG ‘Risk Management’,
 WG ‘Cases/Analyses of Islamic Terrorism’,
 WG ‘Islamist Terrorist Headcount’,
 WG ‘Radicalisation’,
 WG ‘Transnational Aspects’,
 WG ‘Status-Related Accompanying Measures’.
In the ‘Daily Briefing’ working group all the autho
rities involved in the GTAZ convene for a 30-minute 
meeting to discuss the latest findings on a daily basis 
and to present results and reports from other areas of 
work (Deutscher Bundestag 2018d: 8).
-
The ‘Threat Assessment’ working group meets on an 
ad hoc basis as necessary to discuss current findings 
and to draw up and update joint threat assessments. 
These results “serve to enable the reliable evaluation 
of a possible need for action and of the threat situa
tion, and to accelerate proceedings in case of facts and 
circumstances indicating an acute threat” (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2018d: 8).
-
The working group ‘Operational Exchange of Informa
tion’ meets on an ad hoc basis to enable an exchange 
of intelligence between the police and the intelligence 
services. Lines of inquiry are identified at the meetings 
and operational measures are coordinated “with the 
aim of swift operations planning” (Deutscher Bundes
tag 2018d: 8).
-
-
The ‘Case Assessment’ working group meets on an 
ad hoc basis around three to four times a year. At the 
meetings, multi-case situation assessments are carried 
out and analyses of “selected fields of Islamist terro
rism with a German connection” are drawn up. Points 
on the agenda are jointly clarified and agreed between 
the Federal Criminal Police Office, the Federal Intel
ligence Service and the Federal Office for the Protec
tion of the Constitution. The relevant Land Criminal 
Police Offices and Land Offices for the Protection of 
the Constitution are invited to these meetings as ap
propriate to the given agenda. In addition to terrorist 
activities, this working group also evaluates secondary 
criminal offences (such as the illegal procurement of 
identity papers, procurement of weapons) and corres
ponding measures and prevention strategies are defi
ned (Deutscher Bundestag 2018d: 8f).
-
-
-
-
-
-
The ‘Structural Analysis’ working group carries out 
basic research projects on the structures and modus 
operandi of Islamist networks and undertakes centra
lised structural analyses to “identify and classify long
term aspects of the workings and methods of interna
tionally operative terrorist groups and suspects”. These 
meetings also take place on an ad hoc basis (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2018d: 9).
-
-
-
The ‘Radicalisation’ working group was established in 
2009 and has been managed since 2019 by the “Radi
calisation” counselling centre of the Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees. Meetings to share informa
tion and experiences in the field of deradicalisation 
measures are held annually and on an ad hoc basis as 
required. Sub-working groups focus on various topics 
throughout the course of the year, drafting joint gui
delines, for example. In addition, new deradicalisation 
and intervention measures are developed and “stra
tegies for combating radicalisation in the Islamist mi
lieu” are drawn up (BAMF 2019; Deutscher Bundestag 
2018: 9).
-
-
-
-
-
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The ‘Transnational Aspects’ working group meets 
roughly four times a year on an ad hoc basis. This 
work group is tasked with “clarifying and evaluating 
influencing factors originating from abroad and deve
lopments in the field of international Islamic terro
rism, where these affect German interests” (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2018d: 9).
-
-
The working group ‘Status-Related Accompanying 
Measures’ (Status working group) was set up by the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior in 2005 and is under 
the overall direction of the Federal Office for Migra
tion and Refugees. It meets at least once a month with 
the aim of “terminating the residence of persons with 
an Islamist terrorist background” and enforcing “the 
relevant status-related measures in accordance with 
the law on asylum, foreigners and nationality to this 
end”. The Status working group also analyses the re
gisters of foreign residents and performs correspon
ding data matching to enable the “timely identification 
of legally possible prevention measures in the area 
of the law on foreigners and asylum law” (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2018: 9). 
-
-
-
3.1.2 Joint Centre for Countering Extremism 
and Terrorism (GETZ)
The Joint Centre for Countering Right-Wing Extre
mism was set up along the lines of the GTAZ at the 
end of 2011, after the existence of the right-wing ext
remist National Socialist Underground (NSU) and the 
results of investigations into the organisation became 
known. In 2012, the Joint Centre for Countering Right-
Wing Extremism was succeeded by the Joint Centre 
for Countering Extremism and Terrorism (Gemeinsa
mes Extremismus- und Terrorismusabwehrzentrum, 
GETZ) (Deutscher Bundestag 2018d: 28). Based in Co
logne, the GETZ serves as a communication platform 
for federal and Land authorities with the aim of “com
bating extremism and terrorism by right-wing and 
left-wing organisations and foreigners and pursuing 
counter-intelligence” (BfV 2020b). The Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees is also represented at the 
GETZ, together with the following authorities:
-
-
-
-
-
 The Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution,
 the Federal Intelligence Service,
 the Federal Office for the Military Counter-
Intelligence Service,
 the Land Offices for the Protection of the 
Constitution,
 the Federal Criminal Police Office,
 the Federal Police,
 the European Police Office (EUROPOL),
 the Federal Public Prosecutor,
 the Central Customs Authority,
 the Land Criminal Police Offices,
 The Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export 
Control (BfV 2020b)
In the GETZ the Federal Office for Migration and 
Refugees is the point of contact regarding politi
cally motivated crime involving foreign ideology, that 
is, such cases which have a foreign, but not Islamist 
background. Similarly to its role at the GTAZ, the role 
of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees at 
the GETZ is based on its expertise in residence- and 
asylum-related issues and its status as a migration 
authority at federal level.
-
3.1.3 Land working groups
In addition to the GTAZ and the GETZ, the Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees is also represented 
in bodies comparable to the Status working group at 
Land level – the Land working groups. At Land level, 
the Department ‘Operational Cooperation with the Fe
deral and Land Security Services’ (Security department) 
of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees parti
cipates in the 15 working groups (Table 4).
-
-
The ‘Special Task Force Dangerous Foreigners’ of the 
Baden-Württemberg interior ministry provides an ex
ample of the role played by the Federal Office for Mi
gration and Refugees in these cooperation bodies. The 
special task force can submit a “written request for the 
prioritisation of legal actions before the administra
tive courts under asylum law” to the point of contact 
at the branch office of the Federal Office for Migration 
and Refugees in Karlsruhe or to the Security depart
ment of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 
in Nuremberg, for example (Landtag BW 2018: 4). The 
Baden-Württemberg Land Criminal Police Office re
ports persons who constitute a threat to public secu
rity and order to the special task force. Where remo
val of the person concerned is not possible, “a chain of 
sanctions under the law relating to foreigners, such as 
expulsions, geographic restrictions or requirements to 
report to the authorities” is initiated through the Fede
ral Office for Migration and Refugees and the foreig
ners authorities, according to the competent body in 
the case concerned (Landtag BW 2018: 3).
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
Table 4: Land work groups in which the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees is involved
Federal state Body
Baden-Württemberg
WG ‘Termination of residence of foreigners classifiable as dangerous’ / since 2018: 
‘Special Task Force Dangerous Foreigners’ 
Bavaria
WG ‘Expedited identification and expulsion of potential offenders from the area of Islamist terrorism 
and/or extremism’ (WG BIRGiT)
Berlin WG ‘Extremist foreigners’ (AG ExtrA)
Brandenburg ‘Standing work group on residence and naturalisation’ (WG SAGA)
Bremen ‘Case conference’ (no meetings held)
Hamburg ‘Counter-terrorism coordination’ (ATK) (no meetings held)
Hesse WG ‘for the expedited return of identified Islamist offenders (in Hesse)’ (WG BReiT)
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania ‘Expert working group on combating terrorism’ (FAKT)
Lower Saxony WG ‘Individual cases’ (AGE)
North Rhine-Westphalia WG ‘Security conference’ (SiKo)
Rhineland-Palatinate WG ‘Return of foreign potential offenders’ (RaG) (no meetings held)
Saarland -
Saxony-Anhalt WG ARIS ‘The law on foreigners and internal security in Saxony-Anhalt’
Saxony WG ‘Residence’
Schleswig-Holstein WG ‘Residence aspects of handling extremist/terrorist foreigners’ (ABex)
Thuringia WG ‘Residence and nationality aspects of handling persons from the area of foreign extremism’ (Aux)
3.2 At local government level: 
The role of the foreigners 
authorities
In addition to the level of federal authorities, the local 
level at the place of residence of potential offenders 
is of central importance to information sharing, for 
which the foreigners authorities are responsible. In 
accordance with the Federal Act on the Protection of 
the Constitution, the foreigners authorities of the Län
der forward information which comes to their know
ledge regarding, inter alia, attempts directed against 
the free democratic order or against the existence or 
security of the Federal Republic or of one of the Län
der to the competent authority on their own initiative, 
including personal data. They also forward information 
about activities directed against the concept of inter
national understanding, in particular peaceful relations 
between nations (Section 18 subs. 1a, Section 3 subs. 
1 first sentence no. 1 and Section 4 of the Federal Act 
on the Protection of the Constitution). The Bavarian 
Act on the Responsibilities and Powers of the Bavarian 
State Police32 provides an example of the regulations 
-
-
applying to the transfer of data from foreigners autho
rities to security services in the Länder. Public bodies 
may transfer personal data to the police when a threat 
to public security is to be assumed (Art. 60 paragraphs 
1 and 2 of the Bavarian Act on the Responsibilities and 
Powers of the Bavarian State Police).
32 German: Gesetz über die Aufgaben und Befugnisse der Bayeri
schen Staatlichen Polizei.
-
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Where appropriate, the foreigners authorities also take 
part in the meetings of the GTAZ working group ‘Status’ 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2006: 6). The foreigners autho
rities are also represented in the working groups of the 
Länder (Table 4). In the working groups the individual 
cases of third-country nationals who constitute a threat 
to public security are presented, discussed and the ap
propriate manner of dealing with them is agreed. With 
the support of the relevant working group, the foreig
ners authorities then attend to implementing measures 
under the law on foreigners. In certain circumstances, 
it may be appropriate to examine possible measures in 
a specific sequence, for example the revocation of the 
international protection status by the Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees before expulsion by the compe
tent foreigners authority (Chapter 5.1, 5.3).
Participants in the Bavarian working group ‘Expedi
ted identification and expulsion of potential offen
ders from the area of Islamist terrorism and/or extre
mism’ (WG BIRGiT), which was set up in 2004, include 
the major Bavarian foreigners authorities, the Bava
rian Land Office for the Protection of the Constitution, 
the Bavarian Land Police Office, the Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees and the Federal Police, for ex
ample. The working group is directed by the Bavarian 
interior ministry (STMI 2014).
3.3 Investigative and reporting 
procedures between the 
migration authorities and 
security services
3.3.1 At federal level
Reporting of security information by the Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees to the security 
services
The security services receive information from the 
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees on third-
country nationals who demonstrate a threat to the se
curity of the Federal Republic of Germany and the free 
democratic basic order. Such information is generally 
obtained within the context of the asylum procedure 
as well as the revocation or withdrawal procedures of 
protection statuses. This is regulated in the following 
legislation:
 Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution33 
 Federal Intelligence Service Act34, 
 Military Counter-Intelligence Service Act35,
 Federal Criminal Police Act36,
 Asylum Act.
The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees notifies 
the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitu
tion (Section 3 subs. 1, Section 18 subs. 1a of the Fede
ral Act on the Protection of the Constitution) of facts 
which become known to it indicating 
-
-
 activities directed against the free democratic 
order or against the existence or security of the Fe
deral Republic or of one of the Länder, or intended 
to unlawfully hinder federal or Land constitutional 
bodies or their members in carrying out their of
ficial duties (Section 3 subs. 1 no. 1 of the Federal 
Act on the Protection of the Constitution),
 activities constituting a threat to state security or 
intelligence activities on behalf of a foreign power 
(Section 3 subs. 1 no. 2 of the Federal Act on the 
Protection of the Constitution),
 activities which jeopardise foreign interests of Ger
many through the use of violence or preparations 
for the same (Section 3 subs. 1 no. 3 of the Federal 
Act on the Protection of the Constitution),
 activities directed against the concept of internati
onal understanding (Art. 9 paragraph 2 of the Basic 
Law), in particular peaceful relations between na
tions (Section 26 subs. 1 of the Basic Law) (Section 
3 subs. 1 no. 4 of the Federal Act on the Protection 
of the Constitution).
-
-
-
-
-
33 German: Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit des Bundes und der 
Länder in Angelegenheiten des Verfassungsschutzes und über 
das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz.
34 German: Gesetz über den Bundesnachrichtendienst.
35 German: Gesetz über den militärischen Abschirmdienst.
36 German: Gesetz über das Bundeskriminalamt und die Zusam
menarbeit des Bundes und der Länder in kriminalpolizeilichen 
Angelegenheiten.
The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitu
tion filters this information and forwards it as approp
riate to the relevant Land Offices for the Protection of 
the Constitution. Similar provisions apply to the trans
fer of information from the Federal Office for Migra
tion and Refugees to the Military Counter-Intelligence 
Service (Section 10 subs. 1 of the Military Counter-In
telligence Service Act), the Federal Intelligence Service 
(Section 23 subs. 1 of the Federal Intelligence Service 
-
-
-
-
-
-
applying to the transfer of data from foreigners autho
rities to security services in the Länder. Public bodies 
may transfer personal data to the police when a threat 
to public security is to be assumed (Art. 60 paragraphs 
1 and 2 of the Bavarian Act on the Responsibilities and 
Powers of the Bavarian State Police).
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
28 The role of the migration authorities in the security context
Act) and the Federal Criminal Police Office (Section 9 
subs. 4 of the Federal Criminal Police Office Act). In 
addition, the Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution, the Federal Intelligence Service and the 
Military Counter-Intelligence Service may request the 
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees to transfer 
the information required to discharge their duties, in
cluding personal data (Section 18 subs. of the Federal 
Act on the Protection of the Constitution, Section 23 
subs. 3 of the Federal Intelligence Service Act in conj. 
with Section 18 subs. 3 of the Federal Act on the Pro
tection of the Constitution, Section 10 subs. 2 of the 
Military Counter-Intelligence Service Act in conj. with 
Section 18 subs. 3 of the Federal Act on the Protec
tion of the Constitution). Similar provisions apply with 
regard to the Federal Criminal Police Office (Section 9 
subs. 1 of the Federal Criminal Police Office Act).
-
-
-
The Security department is responsible for these acti
vities at the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. 
In this role it serves to forward security-related infor
mation arising from the asylum and revocation proce
dure, for example, to the relevant security services and 
law enforcement agencies. The civil service regulations 
of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees de
fine what is security-related and notifiable.
-
-
-
-
Data Sharing Improvement Act (2016) and 
Second Data Sharing Improvement Act (2019) 
The Data Sharing Improvement Act37, which entered 
into force on 5 February 2016, created the conditions 
for establishing the identity of all asylum seekers, be
fore application, and unauthorised entering or stay
ing third-country nationals who entered Germany as 
quickly as possible and for improving the data sharing 
between all authorities involved in the procedure.38 39 
The new security data matching process (consultation 
in the asylum context, ‘AsylKon’) which was introdu
ced with this legislation enables security services to 
-
-
-
-
check at an early juncture “whether any terrorism-re
lated findings or other serious security concerns” apply 
to such persons (BMI 2020c).
-
The Second Data Sharing Improvement Act40, the 
essential elements of which entered into force on 9 
August 2019, included additional measures to increase 
security. The ‘AsylKon’ security data matching process 
which was introduced by the First Data Sharing Impro
vement Act is now also carried out for third-country 
nationals in connection with asylum revocation or with
drawal procedures, readmission requests from another 
Member State, resettlement procedures and other hu
manitarian admission procedures for third-country nati
onals and reallocation procedures for asylum applicants. 
Therefore, these changes partly also apply to regularly 
staying persons. Intelligence from the Federal Police is 
also incorporated into the technically automated secu
rity data matching processes (BMI 2020c).
-
-
-
-
-
As the changes specified here primarily concern proce
dural security matters relating to the asylum process, 
it is not appropriate to discuss them in greater detail 
here, on account of the study’s focus on third-country 
nationals who hold a residence permit (who generally 
do not comprise asylum applicants but only foreigners 
who have been recognised as being entitled to protec
tion). These changes are noteworthy with regard to the 
exchange of data between the security services and 
migration authorities in that they have made it possi
ble to identify persons constituting a threat to public 
security at an earlier juncture.
-
-
-
37 German: Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Registrierung und des 
Datenaustauschs zu aufenthalts- und asylrechtlichen Zwecken.
38 All data collected at the time of registration are now stored in the 
core database of the Central Register of Foreigners at the time 
of the foreigner’s first contact with the authorities. The Act on 
the Central Register of Foreigners (Gesetz über das Ausländer
zentralregister, AZR-Gesetz) was amended: the list of collected 
data in the core database was extended (fingerprints, country of 
origin, contact data such as address, phone numbers and e-mail 
addresses, information on allocation and information on health 
examinations and vaccinations). With that the Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees, the authorities monitoring cross-border 
travel, the Länder police authorities, the reception centres and 
the foreigners authorities all enter data into the core database.
39 This section is based on the EMN/BAMF Annual Policy Report 
2016 (EMN/BAMF 2017: 42).
40 German: Zweites Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Registrierung 
und des Datenaustauschs zu aufenthalts- und asylrechtlichen 
Zwecken.
Reporting of security information by the security 
services to the Federal Office for Migration and 
Refugees
Within the context of the GTAZ the Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees receives, in its capacity as hol
ding the overall direction of the Status working group, 
information on regularly as well as irregularly staying 
persons or asylum seekers from the Federal Office for 
the Protection of the Constitution (Section 19 subs. 1 
first sentence of the Federal Act on the Protection of 
the Constitution), the Federal Criminal Police Office 
(Section 25 subs. 2 of the Federal Police Act) and the 
Federal Police (Section 32 subs. 2 of the Federal Po
lice Act) “for the purpose of preparing measures under 
the law as it relates to foreigners, asylum or nationa
lity”. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 
-
-
-
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forwards this information to the foreigners authorities 
and the authorities concerned with matters of nati
onality in accordance with Section 19 subs. 1 second 
sentence of the Federal Act on the Protection of the 
Constitution, Section 25 subs. 6 first sentence of the 
Federal Police Act and Section 33 subs. 6 of the Fede
ral Police Act (Deutscher Bundestag 2014b: 7). Security 
aspects of the protection status are additionally exa
mined in the course of the so-called standard review. 
In this connection, the Federal Office for Migration 
and Refugees requests information from the security 
services to enable it to “accord due consideration to 
additional low-threshold intelligence of the security 
services” (Deutscher Bundestag 2018e: 10, 2018f: 8; cf. 
Chapter 5.1 regarding revocation and withdrawal of a 
protection status).
-
-
-
3.3.2 At Land and local government level
Reporting of security information by the 
foreigners authorities to the security services
In connection with the security enquiry which the 
competent foreigners authority can submit to the se
curity and intelligence services prior to any issuance or 
extension of a residence permit, a temporary suspen
sion of removal or a permission to remain pending the 
asylum decision the foreigners authorities provide due 
notification when they have any “knowledge indicating 
personal data relevant to security matters” (Section 
3 subs. 3 fifth sentence of the General Administrative 
Regulation to the Residence Act regarding Section 73 
subs. 2 and 3 first sentence of the Act41; cf. Chapter 5.2 
regarding the security enquiry). 
-
-
Aside from the security enquiries, the foreigners au
thorities also forward any security-related information 
of which it obtains knowledge to the security servi
ces. While no specified procedure applies here, it can 
be assumed that the foreigners authorities inform the 
local police authorities as established practice. The 
facts of the cases concerned are elaborated at foreig
ners authorities and forwarded to the competent cen
tral departments at the Land Criminal Police Offices 
and or the Federal Criminal Police Office for possi
ble discussion at the GTAZ and/or GETZ (written reply 
from the Federal Criminal Police Office, 2020). In the 
case of Anis Amri, for example, the foreigners authority 
in Kleve informed the competent police department 
“that a person occupying a room next door to a per
son resident under the name of “Mohamed HASSA” at 
-
-
-
-
-
-
the local community accommodation facility in Em
merich had seen photographs on the latter’s mobile 
phone showing persons dressed in black who were 
armed with rapid-fire weapons (Kalashnikovs) and po
sing with hand grenades. The police duly drew up an 
“Islamism investigation case”. ‘HASSA’ was an alias of 
AMRI [the perpetrator of the attack at Breitscheidplatz 
in Berlin; author’s note], who was not directly iden
tifiable as such” (BMI 2017a: 2; see Attack in Berlin, 
Chapter 2.3). 
-
-
-
41 German: Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift zu § 73 Absatz 2 und 
3 Satz 1 vom 25. August 2008.
Reporting of security information by the security 
services to the foreigners authorities
The GTAZ, GETZ and the Land working groups gene
rally serve as communication and coordination plat
forms offering a vehicle for the exchange of informa
tion between the security services and the foreigners 
authorities. The security and intelligence services addi
tionally furnish the foreigners authorities with infor
mation in response to security enquiries pursuant to 
Section 73 subs. 2 and 3 first sentence of the Resi
dence Act. In the security enquiry, which can be sub
mitted to the security and intelligence services inter 
alia prior to any issuance or extension of a residence 
permit, the foreigners authorities enquire whether 
such issuance or extension is to be withheld pursuant 
to Section 2 subs. 4 of the Residence Act. In this 
connection it is enquired, amongst other things, whe
ther an interest in expulsion applies on account of a 
threat to the free democratic basic order or the secu
rity of the Federal Republic of Germany or participa
tion in violent acts in pursuit of political or religious 
aims (Section 54 subs. 1 nos. 2 and 4 of the Residence 
Act), whether a removal order has been issued pursu
ant to Section 58a of the Residence Act or whether any 
other security concerns exist, whereupon any relevant 
measures under the law as applies to foreigners (such 
as non-extension) are initiated (Chapter 5.2).
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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4 Prevention work by the Federal 
Government
Prevention work is organised in Germany along fe
deralist and cooperative lines. Many different actors 
are involved in prevention work. Important roles are 
played, for example, by the democracy centres of the 
Länder, partnerships for democracy in local commu
nities and involved individuals, organisations and as
sociations from civil society, the Federal Agency for 
Civic Education (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 
BpB), the Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency (Antidis
kriminierungsstelle, ADS), the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior, the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior 
Citizens, Women and Youth and also the Federal Of
fice for Migration and Refugees with its Advice Centre 
on “Radicalisation” and its counselling centres net
work. This chapter covers central federal programmes 
and institutions. There is not sufficient space here to 
present programmes and measures at Land and muni
cipal level or civic and religious (including Muslim) bo
dies involved in prevention work.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
4.1 National prevention 
programme to prevent 
Islamist extremism (NPP)
On 29 March 2017, the Federal Government adop
ted a new ‘National Programme to Prevent Islamist 
Extremism’ (Nationales Präventionsprogramm gegen 
islamistischen Extremismus, NPP).42 It builds on the 
‘Strategy to Prevent Extremism and Promote Demo
cracy’ (Chapter 4.3) and aims to meet the special chal
lenges of Islamist extremism throughout society (BMI 
2020d). € 100 million have been earmarked for the 
NPP in the budget for 2018 and 2019. The programme 
will be continued in the years 2020 and 2021 with an 
equal amount of funds (subject to legislative approval). 
Based on the key elements mentioned in the NPP, an 
“effective national programme aimed at Islamist extre
mism and including additional foci” is to be developed. 
-
-
-
-
These key elements are:
 Places of prevention – municipalities, families and 
the social environment, educational institutions 
and mosque communities;
 Prevention on the internet – support “measures 
which raise awareness among users, multipliers 
and platform providers of dissemination 
strategies and mechanisms of Islamist propa
ganda”, strengthen users’ ability of judgement and 
discourse, for example by target-group specific 
information on civic education, develop guidelines 
for communication for alternative narratives 
to counteract extremist propaganda, and monitor 
Islamist content;
 Prevention through integration – language courses, 
access to the labour market and to labour market 
access measures for refugees; 
 Prevention and deradicalisation in prisons and in 
probation assistance – expand efforts to help radi
calised people leave the scene and support efforts 
to establish Muslim chaplaincy in prisons; 
 Increasing effectiveness – expand research, 
make additional efforts to combine measures, 
improve the risk management, engage in interna
tional and European exchange and cooperation 
(BMI 2017b: 2ff.).
-
-
-
The NPP is based on existing prevention schemes and 
aims to conclude a “Pact for Prevention” together 
with the Länder, “national associations of local au
thorities, security authorities, religious communities 
and civil-society actors” (BMI 2017b: 2, 6). The Fede
ral Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Ministry 
of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth 
jointly lead the programme (BMI 2017b: 7).
-
-
42 This section is based on the EMN/BAMF Annual Policy Report 
2017 (EMN/BAMF 2018: 78f.).
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-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
4.2 Advice Centre on 
“Radicalisation” at 
the Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees
Since 2012, the Advice Centre on Radicalisation is set 
up at the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 
which can be approached by anyone “who observes 
an islamist-motivated radicalisation in their perso
nal environment” (BAMF 2020b)43. Relatives, friends or 
for example also teachers may contact the staff at the 
hotline of the Advice Centre, “which record the cases 
and provide individual and demand-oriented counsel
ling together with the non-profit organisations. Since 
its establishment , the Advice Centre has received 
more than 4.400 calls. There are around 70 specially 
trained employees. Among the employees are social 
pedagogues, political scientists, scholars of Islam and 
psychologists, all trained accordingly to conduct the 
counselling interviews, to develop consulting strate
gies and put them into practice with those seeking for 
counsel. Counselling is provided in the languages Ger
man, Turkish, Arabic, English, Farsi, Russian and Urdu”.
-
-
-
-
The Advice Centre on “Radicalisation” has a nation
wide network of counselling centres in the form of so
called “partners in the field” to whom the staff of the 
counselling centre at the Federal Office for Migration 
and Refugees refer parties seeking counselling. There 
are eleven partner organisations in all, represented at 
more than 16 locations. The department ‘Counselling 
Centre Radicalisation, Prevention’ enables and tracks 
mutual knowledge sharing nationwide between the 
NGOs and the security services and authorities in di
verse discussion formats. The Deradicalisation wor
king group serves as a key platform in this context 
(Chapter 3.1.1).
-
-
-
-
In addition to these counselling services for persons 
with people who are (suspected of) undergoing Isla
mist radicalisation among their acquaintances, there 
are other counselling services and programmes for 
people breaking away from the radical right- and left-
wing scene. Here too, there is no specific focus on 
third-country nationals. 
-
The counselling services are not differentiated accor
ding to the residence status of the persons concerned, 
and deradicalisation measures may also be applied 
-
even if the person concerned is likely to be removed 
(Advice Centre on “Radicalisation” of the Federal Of
fice for Migration and Refugees). 
The work of the Advice Centre on “Radicalisaton” 
demonstrates the integral approach to combating 
terrorism, covering both repressive and preventive 
measures to counter radicalisation and extremism. 
Deradicalisation work already begins in the course 
of a prison stay, for example. This integral approach 
has proved itself in the last years. While the counsel
ling centre is primarily involved with cases of Islamist
motivated radicalisation, it has also dealt with a small 
number of cases in which relatives of people who had 
become radicalised through other channels approa
ched it for help. These cases were referred to the com
petent partners in the field (Advice Centre on “Ra
dicalisation” of the Federal Office for Migration and 
Refugees).
43 This section is based on the EMN/BAMF Annual Policy Report 
2018 (EMN/BAMF 2019: 61).
Evaluation of the Advice Centre
The Research Centre at the Federal Office for Migra
tion and Refugees carried out an evaluation of the Ad
vice Centre on “Radicalisation” in 2017. The presented 
findings show the Advice Centre on “Radicalisation” at 
the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees to have 
proven effective with regard to both the structure of 
the network of counselling centres and its cooperation 
with relevant authorities from the security field. As a 
result of the networking with the security services, the 
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees is able to 
contact the competent authorities in good time in the 
case of (potentially) security-related cases. The secu
rity authorities surveyed in connection with the evalu
ation and the counselling centre itself described this 
cooperation as “highly professional and very good” 
(Uhlmann 2018: 34). Above all, the point of contact of 
the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees at the 
GTAZ and the liaison staff of the Federal Intelligence 
Service, the Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution and the Federal Police, together with the 
network of contacts which was established in 2012 at 
the Land Criminal Police Offices and the Land Offices 
for the Protection of the Constitution, enable “direct 
responses to security-related constellations” (Uhl
mann 2018: 34). 
The counselling centre also rates the manner in which 
the local partners of the network of counselling cen
tres attend to and report security-relevant cases as 
“very professional”. In this context, it notes that “re
porting channels are observed” and the “existing struc
tures and contacts to the security services” are used to 
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report “volatile constellations [...] [very quickly], both 
on weekdays and at the weekend” (Uhlmann 2018: 47). 
For such cases, the Advice Centre at the Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees has developed a so-called 
‘notification guideline’ in consultation with the rele
vant security services and the partners in the field. At 
Land level and in some instances at Federal level there 
are also discussion formats in place which allow NGOs 
and security services to discuss individual security-re
lated cases. In a small number of cases, when measu
res under residence law are necessary, advisors from 
the partners in the field may also attend meetings bet
ween the relevant foreigners authority and the security 
services. There is also increasing cooperation between 
the counselling centre and refugee establishments at 
Land and local government level.
-
-
-
-
The “projectisation” of deradicalisation work was criti
cised in the evaluation – a criticism which is commonly 
aimed at projects subject to limited periods of funding 
and support. According to this line of criticism, the 
short terms of such projects is “at odds with the inten
ded aims of the counselling to pursue sustainable sta
bilisation processes” (Uhlmann 2018: 51). In addition, 
the payment is often considered “inadequate” for the 
“demanding work and the widespread work overload”. 
Recruiting qualified personal also represents an additi
onal challenge (Uhlmann 2018: 51). 
-
-
-
-
4.3 Further measures by the 
Federal Government
The Federal Government adopted the ‘Strategy to 
prevent extremism and promote democracy’ (Stra
tegie der Bundesregierung zur Extremismuspräven
tion und Demokratieförderung) in 2016. This strategy 
paper was sparked by the growing number of politi
cally motivated acts of violence (right-wing-motiva
ted criminal offences against asylum accommodation 
centres, vitriolic and racist hate campaigns online and 
anti-constitutional political movements). The Federal 
Government supports preventive measures in the dif
ferent categories of politically motivated crime and is 
involved in prevention work to counter right-wing ex
tremism, left-wing extremism, Islamist radicalisation, 
Islamophobia, Muslimophobia, antisemitism, antiziga
nism, homophobia and transphobia (Bundesregierung 
2016: 11ff.). Since 2015, the Federal Ministry for Family 
Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth has additi
onally been supporting “efforts by civil society to pro
mote democracy and combat all forms of extremism” 
through the Federal Government programme ‘Demo
kratie leben!’ (BMFSFJ 2020).
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
33Residence-related and residence-terminating measures
5 Residence-related and 
residence-terminating measures 
Third-country nationals whom the security services 
consider to represent a threat to public security face 
consequences under the law on residence. The possi
ble residence-related and residence-terminating mea
sures are to be examined in the context of each indivi
dual case and are presented in the following chapters. 
These measures include:
-
-
-
 Expulsion,
 non-extension or subsequent reduction of the pe
riod of validity of the temporary residence permit,
 revocation or withdrawal of the residence permit 
and international protection status,
 transfer to the EU Member State which issued the 
residence permit,
 return to the country of origin or another third 
country,
 curtailment of the rights pertaining to the resi
dence permit (surveillance on grounds of internal 
security),
 ban on leaving the federal territory,
 alerts (determination of whereabouts, detain
ment, reservations regarding entry into the federal 
territory),
 ban on entry and residence and
 refusal of entry at the border.
-
-
-
The authorities responsible for ordering the respec
tive measures are the foreigners authorities, and at the 
border also the border police authorities. Where the 
individuals concerned are beneficiaries of protection 
and there are corresponding indications that they may 
represent a threat to public security, the Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees assesses the option of re
voking and withdrawing the protection status (stan
dard review), independently of the review of the case 
under residence law.
-
-
-
5.1 Expulsion
The expulsion of persons who represent a threat to 
public security as defined in this study is regulated in 
Sections 53, 54 and 55 of the Residence Act. “Expul-
sion is [...] not an actual action, but an administra
tive act which ends the legality of a stay and gives rise 
to an obligation to leave the federal territory” (Hoff
meyer-Zlotnik 2017: 19). Expulsion is not part of the 
return procedure, but a prerequisite. Expulsion is car
ried out by removal. Section 53 subs. 1 of the Resi
dence Act stipulates that a person who endangers pu
blic security and order, the free democratic basic order 
or any other significant interests of the Federal Repub
lic of Germany is to be expelled where the weighing of 
the interest in expulsion (Section 54 of the Residence 
Act) against the interest in the foreigner remaining in 
the federal territory (Section 55 of the Residence Act) in 
the individual case concerned shows the public interest 
in expulsion to outweigh the interest in the foreigner 
remaining. The interest in expulsion in cases involving a 
threat to public security as defined in this study is esta
blished as a legal norm in Section 54 subs. 1 nos. 2-5.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
In the decision on expulsion, a distinction is made 
between whether the interest in expulsion is “serious” 
(Section 54 subs. 2 of the Residence Act) or “particu
larly serious” (Section 54 subs. 1 of the Residence Act). 
A particularly serious interest in expulsion applies, 
for example, when the person represents a threat to 
the free democratic basic order or the security of the 
Federal Republic of Germany; this is to be assumed 
where facts justify the conclusion that the person 
concerned belongs to or has belonged to, or supports 
or has supported an organisation which supports ter
rorism, or is preparing or has prepared a serious vio
lent offence endangering the state (Section 54 subs. 1 
no. 2 of the Residence Act), or where the person par
ticipates in acts of violence or publicly incites to vio
lence in pursuit of political objectives or threatens the 
use of violence (Section 54 subs. 1 no. 4 of the Resi
dence Act). Section 53 subs. 3 and 4 of the Residence 
Act stipulates that persons with specific residence 
permits may only be expelled in special circumstances 
(Table 5).
-
-
-
-
-
-
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Table 5: Expulsions on grounds of a threat to public security
A holder of a(n)... ...may only be expelled, if...
residence permit in accordance with the EEC/Turkey Association 
Agreement (Section 5 of the Residence Act)
EU long-term residence permit (Section 9a of the Residence Act)
their personal behaviour presently poses a serious threat to public 
security and order, which constitutes a fundamental interest of 
society, and their expulsion is crucial to protecting this interest 
(Section 53 subs. 3 of the Residence Act).
residence permit as a foreigner who is recognised as being entitled 
to asylum (Section 25 subs. 1 of the Residence Act in conj. with Art. 
16a of the Basic Law)
residence permit as a recognised refugee (Section 25 subs. 2 of the 
Residence Act in conj. with Section 3 subs. 1 of the Asylum Act)
a travel document issued by a German authority in accordance 
with Art. 28 of the Geneva Convention on Refugees
there are serious grounds to suspect that they are to be regarded 
as a threat to the security of the Federal Republic of Germany or 
a terrorist threat or if they poses a threat to the general public or 
the security of the Federal Republic of Germany because they have 
been finally convicted of a serious criminal offence (Section 53 
subs. 3a of the Residence Act).
residence permit as a beneficiary of subsidiary protection (Section 
25 subs. 2 of the Residence Act in conj. with Section 4 subs. 1 of 
the Asylum Act)
they have committed a serious criminal offence or represent a 
threat to the general public or the security of the Federal Republic 
of Germany (Section 53 subs. 3b of the Residence Act).
5.2 Non-extension of the 
residence permit
When third-country nationals submit an application 
for renewal or extension of their residence permit to 
the relevant foreigners authority, the latter may trans
fer personal data which they have in storage via the 
Federal Office of Administration to the security and 
intelligence services by way of the so-called ‘security 
enquiry’ for the purposes of establishing any grounds 
for refusal or examining other security concerns (Sec
tion 73 subs. 2 and 3 first sentence of the Residence 
Act; see also Chapter 3.3.2).
A residence permit is not issued or extended where an 
interest in expulsion applies pursuant to Section 54 
subs. 1 nos. 2 or 4 of the Residence Act or a removal 
order has been issued pursuant to Section 58a of the 
Residence Act (Section 5 subs. 4, Section 8 subs. 1 of 
the Residence Act). This is the case when the person 
concerned
 threatens the free democratic basic order or the 
security of the Federal Republic of Germany; this 
shall be assumed to be the case if there is reason 
to believe that the foreigner is or has been a mem
ber of an organisation which supports terrorism or 
supports or has supported such an organisation, or 
is preparing or has prepared a serious violent of
fence endangering the state44 pursuant to Section 
89a subs. 1 second sentence of the Penal Code, un
less the person recognisably and credibly distan
ces themself from the activity which endangers the 
state (Section 54 subs. 1 no. 2 of the Residence Act),
 is involved in violent activities in the pursuit of po
litical or religious objectives or calls publicly for 
the use of violence or threatens the use of violence 
(Section 54 subs. 1 no. 4 of the Residence Act), 
 or where a removal order has been issued against 
the person concerned on the basis of a prognosis 
based on facts, in order to avert a special danger 
to the security of the Federal Republic of Germany 
or a terrorist threat (Section 58a of the Residence 
Act). 
44 A serious violent offence endangering the state is an offence 
against life in the case of Section 211 (Murder) or Section 212 
(Homicide) or against personal freedom in the cases covered by 
Section 239a (Abduction for purpose of extortion) or Section 
239 b (Hostage-taking) of the Penal Code which, by virtue of the 
circumstances concerned is intended and appropriate to com
promise the continued existence or the security of a state or of 
an international organisation or to eliminate, nullify or undermi
ne constitutional principles of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Section 89a subs. 1 second sentence of the Penal Code).
The security enquiry procedure is regulated in Sec
tion 73 subs. 2 and 3 first sentence of the Residence 
Act, and in the ‘General Administrative Regulation to 
the Residence Act concerning Section 73 subs. 2 and 
subs. 3 first sentence of 25 August 2008’ together with 
supplementary regulations of the Länder. Under these 
provisions, a security enquiry inter alia takes place 
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for persons falling within the purview of the law on 
foreigners:
 prior to issuance of a settlement permit,
 prior to issuance of an EC long-term residence 
permit,
 in certain cases prior to initial issuance of a 
residence permit,
 in certain cases prior to extension of a residence 
permit,
 prior to initial issuance of a residence permit to 
the holder of permission to remain pending the 
asylum decision, and in certain cases prior to initial 
issuance of a residence permit to a person whose 
removal has been suspended.
A stipulated procedure applies to the security enquiry 
(Section 3 of the General Administrative Regulation to 
the Residence Act concerning Section 73 subs. 2 and 
3 first sentence). During the security enquiry, the for
eigners authority transfers any personal data45 which it 
holds to the security services and intelligence services. 
The security services and intelligence services recei
ving the enquiries then provide feedback as to whe
ther there is any intelligence indicating grounds for 
refusal pursuant to Section 5 subs. 4 of the Residence 
Act46 or whether any other security concerns apply 
(Section 73 subs. 3 first sentence first clause of the 
Residence Act) via a technical data gathering system 
which employs reporting abbreviations. They can also 
communicate further details of the available intelli
gence via this system, or reserve such communications 
for the special, direct exchange of information with the 
foreigners authorities (Section 3 subs. 5 of the General 
Administrative Regulation to the Residence Act con
cerning Section 73 subs. 2 and 3 first sentence). After 
the case has been reviewed, the foreigners authority 
informs the security services and intelligence services 
whether the residence permit is refused, granted or re
newed (Section 3 subs. 8 of the General Administrative 
Regulation to the Residence Act concerning Section 73 
subs. 2 and 3 first sentence).
-
-
-
-
-
-
The security services and intelligence services additio
nally check on grounds for refusal or security concerns 
during the period of validity of a residence permit. 
“Where grounds for refusal or security concerns be
come known to the security services and intelligence 
services during the period of validity of the residence 
permit [...] they notify the [...] foreigners authority fort
hwith, using the procedures [...] in accordance with 
the given technical possibilities” (73.3.2 of the General 
Administrative Regulation to the Residence Act). The 
GTAZ, GETZ and the Land working groups also play an 
important role in this context (Chapter 3.1).
In addition to the national administrative regulations, 
the Länder specify additional security-related admi
nistrative procedures under the law on foreigners in 
corresponding regulations. These generally represent 
classified information, on account of the security-rela
ted subject matter47.
45 The transferred personal data includes: Surname; maiden name; 
first names; spelling of names under German law; divergent 
spelling of names; other names; former names; date of birth; 
town and district of birth; country of birth; gender; nationalities; 
aliases (surname, maiden name, date of birth, town and district 
of birth, country of birth, gender, nationalities); ID document 
details (type and number of passport, passport substitute or 
substitute identity document, issuing country, period of validity); 
current address; former addresses; where applicable, period of 
validity of any ordered suspension of removal.
46 Issuance of a residence permit is refused where an interest in 
expulsion applies pursuant to Section 54 subs. 1 nos. 2 or 4 of 
the Residence Act or a removal order has been issued pursuant 
to Section 58a (Section 5 subs. 4 of the Residence Act).
-
-
-
-
-
47 Cf. inter alia no. 73, ‘Administrative regulation of the Baden-
Württemberg interior ministry on the law on foreigners’ VwV-
AusIR-IM); no. 15, Administrative regulation of the Bavarian 
State Ministry of the Interior, for Housing and Transport on the 
law on foreigners’ (BayVV AusIR).
5.3 Withdrawal and revocation 
of the residence permit and 
protection status
Both the residence permit of third-country nationals 
and the protection status of beneficiaries of protection 
can be withdrawn or revoked in certain circumstances. 
A residence permit can be revoked or withdrawn by 
the competent foreigners authority, while the Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees is generally respon
sible for revoking and withdrawing a protection status. 
-
Withdrawal of residence permit
The grounds for expiry of the residence permit are 
stated in Section 51 subs. 1 of the Residence Act. This 
also includes withdrawal of the residence permit (Sec
tion 51 subs. 1 no. 3 of the Residence Act). As the Re
sidence Act does not stipulate any special provisions 
for the withdrawal of residence permits, the general 
legal norm of Section 48 of the Administrative Proce
dure Act, which regulates the withdrawal of an unla
wful administrative act, is applied in such cases (51.1.1 
of the General Administrative Regulation to the Re
sidence Act). Residence permits are thus withdrawn 
in cases in which they should not actually have been 
-
-
-
-
-
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issued in the first place. This is the case, for example, 
when it becomes apparent that an interest in expul
sion of the person concerned already applied at the 
time of issuance of the residence permit, because they 
represented a threat to the free democratic basic order 
or the security of the Federal Republic of Germany or 
were preparing a serious violent offence endangering 
the state (Section 48 of the Administrative Procedure 
Act in conj. with Section 5 subs. 4 of the Residence 
Act). Responsibility for withdrawal lies with the foreig
ners authority in whose district the person has or had 
their habitual place of residence (Section 48 subs. 5 of 
the Administrative Procedure Act in conj. with Section 
3 subs. 1 no. 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act in 
conj. with Section 71 subs. 1 of the Residence Act). 
-
-
Revocation of residence permit
The revocation of residence permits is regulated in 
Section 52 of the Residence Act. As a general rule, resi
dence permits are revoked when the person concerned 
no longer fulfils the requirements according to which 
the residence permit was issued. The general condi
tions pertaining to issuance are no longer fulfilled pur
suant to Section 5, subs. 4 of the Residence Act, for ex
ample, when an interest in expulsion applies because 
the person concerned represents a threat to the free 
democratic basic order or the security of the Federal 
Republic of Germany or is preparing a serious violent 
offence endangering the state (Section 54 subs. 1 nos. 
2 and 4 of the Residence Act), or if a removal order has 
been issued pursuant to Section 58a of the Residence 
Act. Revocation concerns a discretionary decision by 
the competent foreigners authority. “In this connec
tion, the public interest in terminating the residence 
must be weighed against the foreigner’s personal inte
rest in staying in the federal territory” (Heusch/Kluth: 
§ 52 AufenthG marginal note 6).
-
-
-
-
-
-
Withdrawal of international protection status
Recognition as a person entitled to asylum or recog
nition of refugee status is withdrawn where such re
cognition has been granted on the basis of false in
formation or the concealment of essential facts and 
where the person concerned could not be recognised 
on other grounds (Section 73 subs. 2 of the Asylum 
Act). This is the case “where such false information 
or concealment contributed to the granting of reco
gnition” (Fleuß 2019: § 73 AsylG marginal note 32). 
The international protection status is also withdrawn 
where the person concerned “already fulfilled the 
grounds for exclusion” pursuant to Section 3 subs. 2 
-
-
-
-
of the Asylum Act or represented a threat pursuant to 
Section 60 subs. 8 of the Residence Act “at the time of 
granting of protection status” (Eichler 2019: 13). The 
withdrawal of protection status thus only takes place 
in cases “in which protection status was wrongfully 
granted” (Eichler 2019: 10). For the purposes of this 
study, grounds for exclusion apply where the person 
concerned
 has committed crimes against peace or humanity 
or a war crime (Section 3 subs. 1 first sentence 
no. 1 of the Asylum Act),
 has committed a serious non-political criminal 
offence outside of the federal territory prior to 
their admission as a refugee (Section 3 subs. 2 
first sentence no. 2 of the Asylum Act),
 or acts contrary to the aims and principles of the 
United Nations (Section 3 subs. 2 first sentence 
no. 3 of the Asylum Act),
 or is to be regarded as a threat to the security 
of the Federal Republic of Germany (Section 60 
subs. 8 first sentence first alternative of the 
Residence Act).
The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees is 
responsible for the withdrawal of protection status.
Revocation of protection status
The protection status is to be revoked where “[...] a 
person has rightly received the protection status in the 
past but no longer meets the requirements which led 
to recognition” (Eichler 2019: 10). The Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees carries out the so-called 
standard review for recognised refugees and persons 
entitled to asylum after no more than three and five48 
years respectively (Section 73 subs. 2a of the Asylum 
Act). -
-
-
-
48 The Third Act Amending the Asylum Act (German: Drittes 
Gesetz zur Änderung des Asylgesetzes), which entered into force 
on 12 December 2018, extended the period for the standard 
review of protection status from three to five years (Section 73 
subs. 7 of the Residence Act).
This practice stems from the fact that the pos
sibility of making a foreigner’s residence permanent 
through issuance of a settlement permit arises for the 
first time after three years and in this connection it is 
to be checked once again whether the conditions per
taining to protection are still met. The security services 
are also involved here and database matching is car
ried out (Grote 2019: 29). Both the foreigners autho
rity and the security services are required to provide 
further information on any findings and intelligence 
of relevance to revocation. Where new findings are 
available which could lead to revocation, a revocation 
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procedure is initiated. The Federal Office for Migration 
and Refugees notifies the outcome of the revocation 
procedure to the foreigners authority (Section 73 subs. 
2a 2nd sentence of the Asylum Act) and the person 
concerned (Section 73 subs. 4 third sentence of the 
Asylum Act). Revocation of the protection status does 
not automatically lead to loss of the residence per
mit and termination of the foreigner’s stay in Germany 
(Grote 2019: 29). 
-
In addition to the standard review, the Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees can also carry out an ad hoc 
revocation review. Relevant reasons may be a threat to 
security as relevant to this study or findings relating 
to misrepresentation of the applicant’s identity in the 
asylum procedure, criminal offences or a journey to 
the country of origin, for example. Ad hoc reviews of 
residence status are generally carried out in response 
to information or requests from foreigners authorities 
and security services.
5.3.1 Statistics on the revocation and 
withdrawal of protection status
A total of 114,669 revocation and withdrawal procedu
res were dealt with in the first three quarters of 2019. 
Of these, 2,401 (approx. 2.1%) were dealt with “in re
sponse to concrete security-related information from 
other authorities” (Deutscher Bundestag 2020a: 4f.). 
-
-
Figure 1 shows the total number of revocation and 
withdrawal procedures initiated by the Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees in the first three quarters 
of 2019 and the total number of decisions made on 
revocation or withdrawal of the respective protection 
statuses49. The respective shares of procedures initia
ted on security grounds are also indicated. The num
bers in Figure 1 represent the number of procedures 
initiated and completed respectively each refer to the 
period 1 January 2019 to 30 September 201950 (Deut
scher Bundestag 2020a: 4).
-
-
-
In 504 of the procedures resulting from security-rela
ted information the protection status was revoked or 
withdrawn. There were far more cases (1,897) in which 
the protection status was neither revoked nor with
drawn. Figure 1 does not provide any indication as to 
how many of the protection statuses as a whole were 
revoked or withdrawn due to security-related aspects, 
showing only how many procedures were initiated on 
this basis.
-
-
49 Art. 16a of the Basic Law, refugee status, subsidiary protection, 
ban on removal.
50 Procedures that were initiated in the third quarter of 2019 but 
had not yet been completed are therefore only included in the 
number of initiated procedures. Procedures that were initiated 
in the fourth quarter of 2018 but only completed in the first 
quarter of 2019 are only included in the number of procedures 
completed.
Figure 2: Revocation and withdrawal procedures, 1 January to 30 September 2019
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5.4 Return
In recent years, the Federal Government has increa
singly come to see the return51 of third-country nati
onals who constitute a threat to public security as a 
means of protecting public security in Germany (Deut
scher Bundestag 2019b). The corresponding debate 
was sparked not least of all by the failure to remove 
the attacker Anis Amri to his country of origin, Tuni
sia, because passport substitute papers were missing 
(Schneider 2017). The following subchapters describe 
the existing individual return measures and the appur
tenant conditions. 
-
-
-
-
-
51 “‘Return’ is a generic term for all measures which terminate 
or prevent residence and is commonly used as the opposite 
to voluntary or independent departure” (Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik 
2017: 19).
5.4.1 Removal
Removal in general and removal on grounds of a threat 
to public security are regulated in Sections 58, 58a and 
59 of the Residence Act. Removal (Section 58 of the 
Residence Act) entails enforcement of the obligation 
to leave the federal territory. It presupposes that the 
requirement to leave the federal territory is enforcea
ble, no period has been allowed for departure or such 
period has expired, and voluntary fulfilment of the ob
ligation to leave is not assured or supervision of depar
ture appears necessary on grounds of public security 
and order (Section 58 subs. 1 first sentence of the Re
sidence Act). In accordance with Section 58a subs. 1 
of the Residence Act, the supreme Land authority may 
issue a removal order against a person without prior 
expulsion on the basis of a prognosis based on facts, 
in order to avert a special danger to the security of the 
Federal Republic of Germany or a terrorist threat. The 
removal order is immediately enforceable; no removal 
warning is necessary. In addition, for persons whose 
whereabouts are not known the police may use their 
search tools for the purpose of terminating residence 
and apprehension (Section 50 subs. 6 first sentence of 
the Residence Act).
-
-
-
-
No removal order is to be enforced if the conditions 
pertaining to the prohibition of removal pursuant to 
Section 60 subs. 1-7 of the Residence Act are met. A 
prohibition of removal derived from the Geneva Con
vention (Section 60 subs. 1 of the Residence Act) does 
not apply, however, where third-country nationals 
are, for serious reasons, to be regarded as constitu
ting a threat to the security of the Federal Republic 
-
-
of Germany or represent a threat to the general pu
blic because they have been unappealably sentenced 
to a prison term of at least three years for a crime or 
a particularly serious offence (Section 60 subs. 8 first 
sentence of the Residence Act). The same applies if an 
exclusion with regard to asylum legislation following 
Section 3 subs. 2 of the Asylum Act is applicable, in
cluding for example crimes against peace, war crimes 
or crimes against humanity (Section 60 subs. 8 second 
sentence of the Residence Act). Other forms of the 
prohibition of removal, such as the national prohibi
tion of removal (Section 60 subs. 5 or 7 of the Resi
dence Act), however, are still granted in the cases lis
ted above. 
-
-
-
-
-
Where applicable, the enforcement of the expulsion, 
that is removal, may be temporarily suspended in cer
tain circumstances, for example because the travel do
cuments are missing. In such cases, a suspension of 
removal may take place (Section 60a of the Residence 
Act). Where a person creates an obstacle to removal 
themself, for example by misrepresenting their identity 
or nationality, supplying false information or omitting 
of reasonable acts to obtain a passport a ‘suspension 
of removal for persons of unclarified identity’ is orde
red, which entails more restrictive conditions, which 
includes sanctions, in particular a ban on gainful em
ployment (Section 60b of the Residence Act).
-
-
-
-
Complete suspensions of removal to certain countries 
of origin may also be ordered pursuant to Section 60a 
subs. 1 of the Residence Act, such as applies to Syria 
since 30 March 2012, for example (Official Gazette of 
North Rhine-Westphalia, 2019 no. 17 p. 363). At the 
211th meeting of the Standing Conference of Interior 
Ministers and Senators on 4 December 2019 the fede
ral government was requested to work out a recom
mended course of action for the easing of the com
plete suspension of removals in cooperation with the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Commu
nity and the Länder. This is to make possible the re
moval of amongst others potential offenders to Syria 
“under observance of human rights and differentiated 
examination of each case” (IMK 2019b: 26).
-
-
-
-
-
Under certain circumstances, removal may not be im
mediately possible following a removal order pursu
ant to Section 58a of the Residence Act, for example 
due to a lack of transport connections, unwillingness 
of the country of origin to take the person back or be
cause the person concerned has filed an application 
for temporary relief pursuant to Section 58a subs. 4 
second sentence of the Residence Act; Chapter 5.8). In 
such cases, the person concerned is to be detained by 
judicial order in order to ensure due process of remo-
-
-
-
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val (Section 62 subs. 3 first sentence of the Residence 
Act). Detention to prepare removal is not permissi
ble where removal is not possible in the next three 
months for reasons for which the person concerned 
is not responsible (Section 62 subs. 3 third sentence 
of the Residence Act). Preventive detention is limi
ted to six months (Section 62 subs. 4 first sentence of 
the Residence Act) and is extendable by a maximum of 
12 months to a maximum of 18 months only in such 
cases where the person concerned obstructs their re
moval. Where the person concerned cannot be de
tained in accordance with this provision or cannot be 
removed within the time limit applying to preventive 
detention, special monitoring may be ordered (Sec
tions 56 and 56a of the Residence Act).
-
-
-
-
-
Act to Improve the Enforcement of the 
Obligation to Leave the Country
The ‘Act to Improve the Enforcement of the Obliga
tion to Leave the Country’ entered into force on 29 
July 2017.52 It introduced various amendments to the 
Residence Act, concerning aspects such as detention 
to prepare removal, custody to secure removal, the re
quirement for persons who are obliged to leave the 
country to reside in the allocated district, the electro
nic monitoring of such persons and the announcement 
of removals. Further amendments pertained to the ob
ligation to live at reception centres and the read-out 
of data from mobile devices to verify the identity of 
asylum applicants, for example. In introducing the act, 
the Federal Government aimed “to achieve additional 
improvements in the area of repatriation, particularly 
with regard to such persons obliged to leave the coun
try who constitute security risks”. The act was adopted 
in part in response to the attack on a Christmas mar
ket in Berlin in December 2016 (Deutscher Bundes
tag 2017h: 1; Chapter 2.3). This section focuses on the 
amendments concerning residence-related measures 
for persons who constitute a threat to public security 
as defined in this study.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
The act broadened the application of detention to 
prepare removal for persons who are enforceably re
quired to leave the federal territory and who “pose a 
substantial threat to life and limb or to significant ob
jects of legal protection pertaining to internal secu
rity”, for example (Deutscher Bundestag 2017h: 5). For 
such persons, detention to prepare removal may also 
-
-
-
be ordered where removal is not possible within three 
months (Section 62 subs. 3 fourth sentence of the Re
sidence Act). As a general rule, it is not permissible to 
order detention to prepare removal when it is foresee
able that removal will not be enforceable within three 
months (Section 62 subs. 3 third sentence of the Resi
dence Act). 
-
-
-
In addition, the possibility of detaining persons pen
ding removal at penal institutions was re-introduced 
for persons who pose “a substantial threat to the life 
and limb of third parties or to significant objects of 
legal protection pertaining to internal security” (Sec
tion 62a subs. 1 second sentence of the Residence 
Act, old version53). For a number of years now, it has 
only been permissible to detain persons in prepara
tion for their removal at special detention facilities 
(Grote 2014: 7). The question as to the permissibi
lity of detaining potential offenders in preparation for 
removal at penal institutions remains the subject of 
judicial negotiation. The Federal Court of Justice sub
mitted the issue of legality to the European Court of 
Justice in December 2018 for clarification (decision by 
the Federal Court of Justice of 22 November 201854); 
assessment by the European Court of Justice is still 
pending.55
-
-
-
-
-
The act also introduced the possibility of electronic lo
cation monitoring (so-called ‘electronic tagging’) for 
persons constituting a threat to internal security (Sec
tion 56a of the Residence Act). The provisions per
taining to geographic restrictions on persons gran
ted permission to remain pending the asylum decision 
have also been tightened for persons constituting a 
substantial threat to internal security or the life and 
limb of third parties (Section 59b subs. 1 no. 4 of the 
Asylum Act).
-
-
-
-
52 The information presented in this section is based on the 
observations in the EMN/BAMF Policy Report 2017 and 
Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik 2017 (EMN/BAMF 2017: 97f., Hoffmeyer-
Zlotnik 2017: 39).
53 This exception was suspended with the Second Act to Improve 
the Enforcement of the Obligation to Leave the Country. With 
the Second Act a temporary relaxation of the rule requiring 
specialised detention facilities for the purpose of removal was 
introduced, however, which also applies to security cases.
54 Federal Court of Justice, decision of 22 November 2018 – V ZB 
180/17 [ECLI:DE:BGH:2018:221118BVZB180.17.0] – BeckRS 
2018, 35794.
55 A Tunisian whom the security services had classified as a po
tential offender on the grounds that he was suspected of sup
porting a foreign terrorist organisation was detained pending 
removal not at a special detention centre, as is customary, but 
at a normal penal institution. The man lodged an appeal with 
the Federal Court of Justice. While Art. 16 paragraph 1 of Direc
tive 2008/115/EC stipulates exceptions to the requirement for 
detention to take place at dedicated detention facilities when 
no such specialised facilities are available, there is no specific 
provision for cases in which the person concerned constitutes a 
substantial threat to public security (MIGAZIN 2019).
-
-
-
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Second Act to Improve the Enforcement of the 
Obligation to Leave the Country
The ‘Second Act to Improve the Enforcement of the 
Obligation to Leave the Country’ entered into force on 
21 August 2019. This section focuses on the amend
ments concerning residence-related measures for 
persons who constitute a threat to public security in 
terms of this study.
-
The act broadens the application of custody to pre
pare deportation. The revised arrangements stipu
late among other things that, in the case of a remo
val order pursuant Section 58a of the Residence Act 
in order to avert a special danger to the security of 
the Federal Republic of Germany or a terrorist threat, 
a person may be placed in custody by judicial order 
to prepare deportation for up to six weeks when no 
immediate decision is possible on the removal order 
(Section 62 subs. 2 of the Residence Act). Prior to the 
amendment to the law, it was only permissible to 
place such persons in custody when the removal order 
had already been issued or the conditions pertaining to 
preventive detention were met (BMI 2020e).
-
-
-
A further amendment of importance to this study con
cerned the enforcement of detention to prepare remo
val. The act provides for an amendment to Section 62a 
subs. 1 of the Residence Act in two stages. Firstly, the 
requirement for persons detained to prepare their re
moval to be accommodated separately from convicts 
is to be suspended until 30 June 2022. During this pe
riod, detention to prepare removal can thus “also take 
place at penal institutions”, although persons detai
ned to prepare their removal and convicts “are always 
to be kept apart” (BMI 2020e). The Federal Ministry of 
the Interior justifies this amendment on the grounds 
that there is a shortage of places at detention cen
tres for foreigners awaiting removal in Germany (BMI 
2020e). The requirement for detainees awaiting remo
val to be accommodated separately from convicts will 
apply once again from 1 July 2022, subject to the exis
ting exceptions (see above).
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Operational measures to support return
In addition to the named legislative changes to sup
port return further operational measures were taken. 
On 9 February 2017, the Chancellor and the Länder 
prime ministers decided on establishing the Repatria
tion Support Centre (Gemeinsames Zentrum zur Un
terstützung zur Rückkehr, ZUR). The Repatriation Sup
port Centre started work in March 2017; it coordinates 
-
-
-
-
the operative efforts of the Federal and Land authori
ties in the areas of both voluntary and forced returns. 
For example, it supports the Länder in organising coll
ective removals or procuring passport substitutes for 
return purposes (Deutscher Bundestag 2017i: 3).56
-
-
Removal is not always enforceable, for a variety of re
asons – for example due to a lack of travel documents 
and difficulties obtaining passport substitutes. A wor
king group spanning the Federation and the Länder at 
the Standing Conference of Interior Ministers and Se
nators is also concerned with the challenges relating 
to the repatriation of potential offenders, and presen
ted the Standing Conference with recommended ac
tions “to remove legal and actual obstacles pertaining 
to the return of potential offenders” in May 2018 (IMK 
2018: 1). The recommendations included:
-
-
-
-
-
1. Optimisation of work structures in the Länder “to 
enable swift and efficient collaboration between 
all involved authorities”,
2. involvement of the Länder in evolving the concept 
for the “Potential Offenders” task force at the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior,
3. simplification of official procedures via amend
ments to the Residence Act (which were adop
ted in the revised version of the Residence Act in 
2019),
4. establishment of a work group spanning the Fe
deration and the Länder to draw up “recommen
dations on holding potential offenders at prisons”,
5. reduction of the number of judicial authorities in
volved in connection with to removal orders to 
avert a special danger to the security of the Fede
ral Republic of Germany or a terrorist threat 
(Section 58a of the Residence Act),
6. instilling an awareness in the judiciary of diploma
tic assurances in connection with removals regar
ding compliance with Art. 3 of the European Con
vention on Human Rights – Prohibition of torture 
in the country of destination (IMK 2018: 1f.; see 
below).
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
56 This section is based on the EMN/BAMF Policy Report 2017 
(EMN/BAMF 2017: 98f.).
In order to optimise the work structures in the Län
der, the Federal Ministry of the Interior duly took the 
following measures: various workshops were held to 
qualify the Länder in the Security work group at the 
ZUR, on matters such as “enforcement of the obliga
tion to leave the federal territory, on Section 58a of 
the Residence Act, on the establishment of identity, on 
the possibilities of retrograde data matching with the 
Visa information system”. In addition, confidential 
-
-
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Federation-Länder case conferences were held with 
individual Länder in the Security work group at the 
ZUR and in the Status work group of the GTAZ. The 
Federal Foreign Office was also more closely involved 
in the Security work group, for the purposes of “wor
king on cases with the Länder and discussing case files 
according to specific aspects relating to countries of 
origin” (Deutscher Bundestag 2018c: 18).
-
The establishment of the GTAZ, the GETZ and the re
spective Land working groups shows that the German 
authorities are attaching priority to the repatriation of 
third-country nationals who constitute a threat to pu
blic security. As it is the Länder which are responsible 
for enforcing removals in Germany, this prioritisation 
is also in evidence at Land level. The Land government 
of Hesse, for example, attaches “clear priority to the 
repatriation of potential offenders” (Hessischer Land
tag 2019: 1).
-
-
-
Court rulings relating to the removal order
Both the Federal Administrative Court and the Fede
ral Constitutional Court made important rulings on 
the removal order pursuant to Section 58a of the Re
sidence Act in 2017. Under these rulings, so-called 
potential offenders can be removed on the basis of 
a prognosis based on facts in order to avert a special 
danger to the security of the Federal Republic of Ger
many or a terrorist threat, without requiring prior ex
pulsion or termination of the right of residence by any 
other means (Section 58a subs. 1 first sentence of the 
Residence Act). Equally, there is no requirement for 
the person concerned to have been convicted of a cri
minal offence. Removal may not be enforced, however, 
where it is prohibited by law, in particular where the 
person concerned faces the threat of torture, inhuman 
or degrading treatment in the country of destination 
(Section 58a subs. 3 first sentence of the Residence 
Act; Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights). 
-
-
-
-
-
This provision has been in force since 2005, but was 
applied for the first time only in 2017 as the hurdles 
are considered too high (Mascolo/Steinke 2017). On 
21 March 201757 the Federal Administrative Court re
jected the granting of temporary relief against the first 
removal of two persons which had been ordered on 
the basis of Section 58a of the Residence Act (Federal 
-
Administrative Court, ruling of 21 March 201758). This 
was seen as a sign that the provision might be applied 
more frequently in future (Mascolo/Steinke 2017). On 
22 August 2017, the appeal against the two removals 
was finally dismissed (Federal Administrative Court, 
judgements of 22 August 2017 ). On 24 July 2017 the 
Federal Constitutional Court ruled in another case that 
the provision contained in Section 58a of the Resi
dence Act is compatible with the Basic Law (Federal 
Constitutional Court, ruling of 24 July 201759).60 
-
There is also a ruling by the Federal Administrative 
Court from 21 March 2017 regarding the right to res
pect for private and family life (Art. 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights) in connection with a re
moval order pursuant to Section 58a of the Residence 
Act. A removal order pursuant to Section 58a of the 
Residence Act was issued for an Algerian national who 
had been classified as a potential offender in the radi
cal Islamist scene in Germany. He subsequently filed 
an application for temporary relief pursuant to Section 
80 subs. 5 of the Code of Administrative Court Proce
dure, which was rejected. The applicant was then re
moved before the main proceedings had begun. 
-
-
-
-
-
The Federal Administrative Court stated that, in exa
mining the granting of temporary relief, “despite the 
fact that the applicant was rooted in Germany [...] the 
intended termination of his residence is not dispropor
tionate, including in the context of Art. 2 paragraph 1 
and Art. 6 of the Basic Law and Art. 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, in view of the circum
stances which apply in this case, with a terrorist attack 
by the applicant possible at any time.” The interest in 
expulsion was considered greater than the interest in 
remaining in this case, despite the fact that “his mo
ther, his siblings and his wife to whom he is married in 
accordance with Islamic rituals, and who holds Ger
man nationality”, live in Germany. The applicant had 
also invoked the prohibition of removal pursuant to 
Section 60 subs. 5 (threat of torture). The Adminis
trative Court also rejected this, on the grounds that 
“existing dangers [...] can be countered with appropri
ate diplomatic assurances”. The Senate thus made the 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
removal contingent on the provision of corresponding 
assurances. 
57 Federal Administrative Court, ruling of 21.03.2017 – 1 VR.17 
[ECLI:DE:BVerwG:2017:210317B1VR1.17.0] – BVerwGE 158, 225 
marginal note 3.
58 Federal Administrative Court, judgements of 22.08.2017 – 1 A 
3.17 [ECLI:DE:BVerwG:2017:220817U1A3.17.0] – BeckRS 2017, 
127231 and 1 A 2.17 
[ECLI:DE:BVerwG:2017:220817U1A2.17.0] – BeckRS 2017, 
128737.
59 Federal Constitutional Court, chamber ruling of 24 July 2017 – 
2 BvR 1487/17 [ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2017:rk20170724.2bvr148717] 
– BeckRS 2017, 118574 marginal note 20.
60 The information presented in this section is based on obser
vations in the EMN/BAMF Policy Report 2017 (EMN/BAMF 
2017: 98).
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removal contingent on the provision of corresponding 
assurances. 
In certain circumstances, the European Court of 
Human Rights regards such diplomatic assurances as a 
suitable instrument to remove the danger of inhuman 
or degrading treatment (Art. 3 of the European Con
vention on Human Rights) even where – in contrast 
to Algeria – systematic torture and mistreatment take 
place in the countries concerned. In response to an 
enquiry from the Federal Administrative Court regar
ding Algeria, the Federal Foreign Office stated that the 
Algerian ministry of justice had given the German au
thorities “written guarantees concerning trial and pri
son conditions” (Federal Administrative Court, ruling 
of 21 March 201761).
-
-
-
-
61 Federal Administrative Court, ruling of 21.03.2017 – 1 VR.17 
[ECLI:DE:BVerwG:2017:210317B1VR1.17.0] – BVerwGE 158, 
225 Rn. 43.
5.4.2 Removal to another EU Member State
Third-country nationals who hold certain residence 
permits in another EU Member State may also legiti
mately stay (temporarily) in Germany. This is the case, 
for example, for holders of a valid residence permit 
in another Member State which permits a stay of 90 
days within any period of 180 days in another Member 
State in accordance with Art. 21 of the Schengen Con
vention, as well as for third country family members 
of EU nationals (Citizens’ Rights Directive (Directive 
2004/38/EC)62 and Section 3 of the Freedom of Move
ment Act/EU63), or for holders of an EU long-term 
residence permit for other EU Member States (Sec
tion 38a of the Residence Act) and for persons who 
are recognised as refugees in another state under the 
Geneva Convention on Refugees. Such a person who 
is classified as being a threat to public security can be 
removed to the EU Member State in which they hold 
a residence permit.
-
-
-
-
62 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union 
and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 
1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 
72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 
90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC.
63 German: Gesetz über die allgemeine Freizügigkeit von Unions
bürgern.
-
5.4.3 Statistics: Removals in cases of threats to 
public security
Statistics on removals of persons belonging to Isla
mist terrorist circles “have only been kept since 2017 
[...]. Removal orders pursuant to Section 58a of the 
Residence Act were issued for the first time in 2017” 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2018c: 8). Table 6 shows the 
number of removals in 2017 and 2018 of persons clas
sified as belonging to the Islamist terrorist field and 
who were dealt with by the Status working group at 
the GTAZ or in a Land working group in which the Fe
deral Office for Migration and Refugees participates 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2008: 2). As the Status working 
group is concerned solely with the Islamist category, 
this is to receive due consideration when interpreting 
the figures, and the figures do not allow any inferences 
with regard to the total number of all removals effec
ted in the face of a threat to public security.
-
-
-
-
In 2017 a total of 56 persons from Islamist terro
rist circles were removed. Half of this total (30 per
sons) were classified as potential offenders. In 2018 
the number of such removals fell to 47, of which 22 
cases involved potential offenders. The main coun
tries of origin in both years were Tunisia and Algeria. 
In 2017 seven persons were removed on the basis of 
a removal order pursuant to Section 58a of the Resi
dence Act. The corresponding figure in 2018 stood at 
five persons.
-
-
-
-
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Table 6: Removals of persons classified as belonging to the Islamist terrorist field (2017-2018)
20171)  20181)
Total
of which, 
potential 
offenders
of which, 
persons of 
interest
Total
of which, 
potential 
offenders
of which, 
persons of 
interest
Co
un
tr
ie
s 
of
 d
es
ti
na
ti
on
Removals 56 30 4 47 22 2
Of which, removal orders 
(Section 58a of the Residence Act)
7 7 0 5 4 1
Afghanistan 1 1 0 2 2 0
Egypt 0 0 0 1 0 0
Algeria 8 4 1 9 2 1
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 2 0 0 0 0
France 2 1 0 0 0 0
Georgia 0 0 0 2 0 0
Iraq 1 0 0 4 4 0
Italy 1 0 0 2 0 0
Croatia 0 0 0 1 0 0
Kenya 1 1 0 0 0 0
Lebanon 2 2 0 2 2 0
Morocco 4 4 0 5 0 1
Netherlands 1 0 0 1 0 0
Nigeria 1 1 0 0 0 0
Austria 1 1 0 0 0 0
Pakistan 2 0 0 1 0 0
Russian Federation 7 4 1 1 0 0
Sweden 2 0 0 0 0 0
Serbia 1 0 0 1 1 0
Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0
Tunisia 14 6 1 11 7 0
Turkey 3 2 1 4 4 0
Belarus 1 1 0 0 0 0
Source: Deutscher Bundestag 2018c: 8.
1) The figures in this table relate solely to foreign persons whose cases were dealt with by the Status working group at the GTAZ 
or by one of the Land working groups in which the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees participates (Deutscher Bundes
tag 2018c: 2).
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5.5 Monitoring on security 
grounds
Beyond the measures outlined above, foreigners au
thorities also have additional measures at their dispo
sal under the law on residence. A person against whom 
an expulsion order has been issued because they 
-
-
 threaten the free democratic basic order or the 
security of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
 belong to the leadership of a banned organisation, 
 participate in acts of violence in pursuit of political 
or religious objectives, 
 publicly incite hate against sections of the 
population or threaten the same, 
 or against whom a removal order exists 
is obliged to report to the competent police office at 
least once a week, unless the foreigners authority sti
pulates otherwise. A reporting obligation may also be 
imposed in cases in which none of the above-stated 
interests in expulsion apply, where this is necessary 
in order to avert a threat to public security and order 
(Section 56 subs. 1 second sentence no. 2, Section 54 
subs. 1 nos. 2-5, Section 58a of the Residence Act). Re
sidence is restricted to the district covered by the for
eigners authority (Section 56 subs. 2 of the Residence 
Act), except where it appears expedient to stipulate 
residence in another location or at specific types of ac
commodation in order to hinder or prevent activities 
which have led to the expulsion order and to facilitate 
monitoring of compliance with provisions under the 
law governing organisations and associations or other 
statutory conditions and obligations or to prevent the 
person concerned from repeating criminal offences of 
substantial significance which have led to the expul
sion order (Section 56 subs. 3 of the Residence Act). 
-
-
-
-
-
In addition, contact to certain persons or groups and 
the use of certain means of communication may also 
be prohibited where such restrictions are necessary in 
order to avert a substantial threat to internal security 
or the life and limb of third parties (Section 56 subs. 4 
of the Residence Act). 
A further measure involves electronic location moni
toring in the form of an electronic tag. A person whose 
residence is subject to geographic restrictions or to 
whom contact restrictions apply may be required by 
judicial order to submit to electronic location moni
toring. Such an order applies for a maximum of three 
months and can be extended by subsequent periods of 
a maximum of three months if the relevant conditions 
-
-
continue to apply. The foreigners authority collects 
and stores data on the person’s whereabouts via auto
mated processes by means of electronic tagging (Sec
tion 56a of the Residence Act).
-
-
5.6 Prohibition and restriction 
of political activities
A person’s political activities may be restricted or pro
hibited by the competent foreigners authority, if they
-
 impair or endanger political decision-making, 
peaceful co-existence, public security and order or 
any other substantial interests of the Federal 
Republic of Germany,
 may be counter to the interests of the Federal 
Republic of Germany in the field of foreign po
licy or to the obligations of the Federal Republic of 
Germany under international law,
 contravene the laws of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, particularly in connection with the use of 
violence,
 are intended to promote parties, other organisa
tions, establishments or activities outside of the 
federal territory whose aims or means are incom
patible with the fundamental values of a system 
of government which respects human dignity 
(Section 47 subs. 1 of the Residence Act).
-
-
-
A person’s political activities are to be prohibited by 
the competent foreigners authority, if they
 endanger the free democratic basic order or the 
security of the Federal Republic of Germany or 
contravene the codified standards of international 
law,
 publicly support, advocate or incite to the use of 
violence as a means of enforcing political, religious 
or other interests or are capable of inciting such vi
olence or
 support organisations, political movements or 
groups within or outside of the federal territory 
which have initiated, advocated or threatened at
tacks on persons or objects in the federal territory 
or attacks on Germans or German establishments 
outside of the federal territory (Section 47 subs. 2 
of the Residence Act).
-
-
45Residence-related and residence-terminating measures
5.7 Ban on entry and 
residence, ban on leaving 
the federal territory
Ban on entry and residence
A ban on entry and residence is to be issued against a 
person who has been refused entry, removed or ex
pelled. As a result of the ban on entry and residence, 
the person concerned may neither enter nor reside 
in the federal territory again, neither may they be is
sued with a residence permit, even in the event of an 
entitlement under this Act (Section 11 subs. 1 of the 
Residence Act). The duration of the ban on entry and 
residence is subject to a discretionary decision. As a 
general rule, it should not exceed five years (Section 
11, subs. 3 of the Residence Act). Exceptions to this 
limit apply in case of a threat to security and are listed 
in Table 7. An alert may be issued regarding a person 
against whom a ban on entry and residence has been 
imposed pursuant to Section 11 of the Residence Act 
for the purposes of refusal of entry and in the event 
of their arrival in the Federal territory or the Schengen 
area (Section 50 subs. 1 first and second sentence of 
the Residence Act; see Schengen Information System 
(SIS) in Chapter 6.2, 6.2.3). In addition, the data rela
ting to persons against whose entry into the federal 
territory reservations apply, for example because of 
interests in their expulsion, are stored in the Central 
-
-
-
 
Register of Foreigners (Section 2 subs. 2 no. 4 of the 
Central Register of Foreigners Act in conj. with Section 5 
subs. 1 of the Residence Act).
Ban on leaving the federal territory
In certain circumstances, a person who constitutes a 
threat to the internal or external security or any other 
substantial interests of the Federal Republic of Ger
many may also be banned from leaving Germany (Sec
tion 46 subs. 2 first sentence of the Residence Act 
in conj. with Section 10 and Section 7 subs. 1 of the 
Passport Act. This is the case, for example, where the 
person’s leaving the country “constitutes a threat to 
the internal or external security or any other substan
tial interests of the Federal Republic of Germany” or 
where they intend to leave the country in order to pre
pare a serious violent offence endangering the state64, 
pursuant to Section 89a of the Penal Code (Hörich/
Hruschka 2019: § 46 AufenthG, marginal note 29ff.).
-
-
-
-
64 A serious violent offence endangering the state is an offence 
against life in the case of Section 211 (Murder) or Section 212 
(Homicide) or against personal freedom in the cases covered by 
Section 239a (Abduction for purpose of extortion) or Section 
239 b (Hostage-taking) of the Penal Code which, by virtue of the 
circumstances concerned, is intended and appropriate to com
promise the continued existence or the security of a state or of 
an international organisation or to eliminate, nullify or undermi
ne constitutional principles of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Section 89a subs. 1 second sentence of the Penal Code).
-
-
Table 7: Durations of bans on entry and residence in case of threats to security
Case Duration of the ban on entry and 
residence
Amendments to stipulated duration
Expulsion due to a criminal conviction or 
where the person constitutes a serious 
threat to public security and order (Section 
11 subs. 5 of the Residence Act)
As a rule, a maximum of ten years Rescission and reduction to protect 
interests meriting protection of the person 
concerned and extensions on grounds 
of public security and order are possible 
(Section 11 subs. 4 of the Residence Act)
Expulsion due to a crime against peace, 
a war crime or a crime against humanity 
or to avert a threat to the security of 
the Federal Republic of Germany or a 
terrorist threat (Section 11 subs. 5a of the 
Residence Act)
As a rule, 20 years as standard Rescission and reduction are ruled out 
as a general principle. Exceptions may be 
approved by the supreme Land authority 
in individual cases. Extension on grounds 
of public security and order is possible.
Removal on the grounds of a removal or
der to avert a special threat to the security 
of the Federal Republic of Germany or a 
terrorist threat (Section 11 subs. 5b of the 
Residence Act)
- As a rule, an of unlimited duration Rescission and reduction are ruled out 
as a general principle. Exceptions may be 
approved by the supreme Land authority 
in individual cases.
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5.8 Legal remedies
Persons against whom measures are undertaken under 
the law on residence can appeal against such admi
nistrative acts and pursue actions for their rescission. 
Such appeals or actions have suspensory effect pur
suant to Section 80 subs. 1 first sentence of the Code 
of Administrative Court Procedure, with exemptions 
for measures under the law on foreigners stipulated in 
Section 84 subs. 1 of the Residence Act. Appeals and 
legal actions have no suspensory effect in the case of 
non-extension, revocation or withdrawal of a resi
-
-
-
dence permit, for example (see also Table 8). In cases 
in which suspensory effect does not apply, temporary 
relief may be applied for pursuant to Section 80 subs. 
5 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure, how
ever. This applies in the case of the removal order 
pursuant to Section 58a of the Residence Act, for ex
ample. Here, the court hearing the main proceedings 
can order or restore the suspensory effect in part or 
in its entirety. The corresponding application may be 
filed prior to bringing the action for rescission. Where 
the administrative act has already been enforced at the 
time of the decision, the court may order rescission of 
the enforcement. 
-
-
Table 8: Information to be provided on measures under residence law
Measures under residence law Contents of information to be provided on the measure
Expulsion (Section 53 of the Residence Act) ● Written statement of grounds (Section 77 subs. 1 no. 2 of the Residence Act).
● Explanation of legal remedies and deadlines to be observed (Section 77 subs. 1 second sentence 
of the Residence Act).
Non-extension of the residence permit 
(Section 8 of the Residence Act)
● Written statement of grounds (Section 77 subs. 1 no. 1 lit. a of the Residence Act).
● Explanation of legal remedies and deadlines to be observed (Section 77 subs. 1 second sentence 
of the Residence Act).
● Appeals and legal actions have no suspensory effect (Section 84 subs. 1 no. 1 of the Residence Act).
Ban on entry and residence 
(Section 11 of the Residence Act)
● Written statement of grounds (Section 77 subs. 1 no. 9 of the Residence Act).
● Explanation of legal remedies and deadlines to be observed (Section 77 subs. 1 second sentence 
of the Residence Act).
● Appeals and legal actions have no suspensory effect (Section 84 subs. 1 no. 7 of the Residence Act).
Ban on leaving the federal territory 
(Section 46 subs. 2 of the Residence Act)
● Generally written statement of grounds (77.1 of the General Administrative Regulation to the 
Residence Act).
● Appeals and legal actions have no suspensory effect (Section 84 subs. 1 no. 6 of the Residence Act).
Prohibition and restriction of political activi
ties (Section 47 of the Residence Act)
- ● Written statement of grounds (Section 77 subs. 1 no. 7 of the Residence Act).
Alert to determine whereabouts and 
effect detainment (Section 50 subs. 6 of 
Residence Act)
● Subjects of alert are not informed.
Revocation/withdrawal of the residence 
permit (Section 52 of the Residence Act)
● Written statement of grounds (Section 77 subs. 1 no. 8 of the Residence Act).
● Explanation of legal remedies and deadlines to be observed (Section 77 subs. 1 second sentence 
of the Residence Act).
● Appeals and legal actions against revocation have suspensory effect in certain cases only 
(Section 84 subs. 1 no. 4 of the Residence Act).
Monitoring for internal security reasons 
(Section 56 of the Residence Act)
● Written statement of grounds (Section 77 subs. 1 no. 7 of the Residence Act).
Removal order 
(Section 58a of the Residence Act)
● Written statement of grounds (Section 77 subs. 1 no. 3 of the Residence Act).
● Issuance of removal order without prior expulsion pursuant to Section 53 of the Residence Act 
(Section 58a subs. 1 of the Residence Act).
● The removal order is immediately enforceable (Section 58a subs. 1 of the Residence Act).
● An application for temporary relief pursuant to the Code of Administrative Courts Procedure is to be 
filed within seven days of announcement of the removal order. Removal may not be enforced until the 
deadline [...] has expired and, where an application is filed within the deadline, until the court has deci
ded on the application for temporary relief (Section 58a subs. 4 of the Residence Act).
-
Removal warning 
(Section 59 of the Residence Act)
● Written statement of grounds (Section 77 subs. 1 no. 4 of the Residence Act).
Detention to prepare removal 
(Section 62 of the Residence Act)
● Detainment on judicial order (Section 62 of the Residence Act). Exemptions apply where there is a risk 
of absconding or a removal order has been issued but is not directly enforceable, for example (Section 
62 subs. 5 of the Residence Act).
Reservations regarding entry into the fede
ral territory (Section 2 subs. 2 no. 4 of the 
Central Register of Foreigners Act)
- ● Subjects of alert are not informed.
● The registration authority provides information about the stored data upon application. 
The provision of information is waived, for example, where disclosure of the information would 
jeopardise public security or order (Section 34 of the Central Register of Foreigners Act).
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Table 8 lists the formal requirements for the adminis
trative act under the Residence Act. Most of the lis
ted measures under residence law require a written 
statement of grounds, explaining legal remedies and 
deadlines to be observed. Appeals and legal actions do 
not generally have suspensory effect, except in cases 
where the competent court grants an application for 
temporary relief pursuant to Section 80 subs. 5 of the 
Code of Administrative Court Procedure.
-
-
Where a person cannot be present at the time of the 
judicial hearing regarding the measure undertaken 
under residence law, on account of a stay abroad, for 
example, the matter may also be negotiated and de
cided without them, in accordance with Section 102 
subs. 2 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure. 
This is of particular significance with regard to poten
tial offenders who are located outside of Germany, for 
example in order to take part in the fighting in Syria 
and Iraq (IS fighters, for example). In proceedings be
fore the Federal Administrative Court and the Higher 
Administrative Court, representation by a counsel for 
the parties concerned is compulsory (Section 67 subs. 
4 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure). 
Where the measure has been undertaken at a time at 
which the person concerned was already abroad and a 
ban on entry and residence has been issued pursuant 
to Section 11 of the Residence Act, the person con
cerned cannot re-enter the federal territory as appeals 
and legal actions have no suspensory effect here (Sec
tion 84 subs. 1 no. 7 of the Residence Act).
-
-
-
-
-
Where, in connection with the measures undertaken 
under residence law, a ban on entry and residence pur
suant to Section 11 of the Residence Act or a ban on 
leaving the federal territory pursuant to Section 46 of 
the Residence Act has been issued (bans on entry and 
residence are issued in connection with expulsion, re
moval and removal following unauthorised entry), the 
person concerned may not re-enter or leave the fede
ral territory while the proceedings are ongoing, as ap
peals and legal actions have no suspensory effect here 
(Section 84 subs. 1 nos. 6 and 7 of the Residence Act). 
By way of exception, the foreigner may be granted 
temporary entry into the federal territory for a short 
period prior to expiry of the ban on entry and resi
dence, if their presence is required for compelling re
asons or if the refusal of permission would constitute 
undue hardship (Section 11 subs. 8 first sentence of 
the Residence Act). 
-
-
-
-
-
-
5.8.1 Handling of confidential information 
in legal proceedings
The administrative courts have jurisdiction for legal 
actions brought against measures under residence 
law. In legal actions concerning measures underta
ken under residence law, particularly where measures 
relating to threats to public security are involved, it 
is possible that confidential information may be used 
during the legal proceedings. Section 99 subs. 1 of the 
Code of Administrative Court Procedure stipulates 
that authorities are obliged to present documents or 
files, to transfer electronic documents and to furnish 
information to the court. The supreme competent su
pervisory authority, that is, the competent ministry, 
may refuse to present, transfer or furnish information, 
however, where disclosure of the content would be 
detrimental to the Federation or a Land or where the 
proceedings require to be kept secret in accordance 
with a law or on account of their nature. “The concept 
of non-disclosure ‘pursuant to a law’ is to be defined 
in narrow terms and is intended to protect a highly 
important area of life which is protected by the con
stitution or by basic rights” (Posser 2019: § 99 VwGO, 
marginal note 21).
-
-
-
On request from a party to the proceedings, the higher 
administrative court determines whether the refusal to 
furnish documents and information is lawful, without 
a corresponding hearing. Where the rules applying to 
the substantive protection of classified information are 
not complied with or where the competent supervi
sory authority asserts that special grounds relating to 
non-disclosure or the protection of classified informa
tion prevent the presentation or transfer of such in
formation, presentation or transfer is effected by fur
nishing the documentation to the court at premises 
specified by the supreme supervisory authority (Sec
tion 99 subs. 2 seventh and eighth sentences of the 
Code of Administrative Court Procedure). Under these 
conditions, the parties to the proceedings65 have no 
access to the files presented to the court (Section 99 
subs. 2 ninth sentence, Section 100 subs. 1 first sen
tence of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure). 
Consequently, in connection with measures which are 
undertaken under residence law on grounds of a threat 
to public security, it is possible that only the court may 
have access to the confidential information.
-
-
-
-
-
-
65 The parties to the proceedings are prosecutors, defendants, 
intervening parties and representatives of the Federation’s 
interests at the Federal Administrative Court or any representa
tives of the public interest who exercise their authorisation to 
participate in the proceedings (Section 63 of the Code of Admi
nistrative Court Procedure).
-
-
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Section 99 of the Code of Administrative Court Proce
dure is criticised by practitioners, who observe that the 
law is silent “in particular on concrete terms of refe
rence under substantive law, on the relationship with 
substantive rights of information and on the conse
quences of a lawfully exercised right to refuse to fur
nish information, all of which poses great difficulties 
in practice. As such, the legal norm is structurally in
adequate and requires amendment” (Posser 2019: § 
99 VwGO, marginal note 1-55). “The European Court 
of Justice has been unable to reach a decision on the 
conformity of Section 99 with EU law to date, as a cor
responding submitted question was withdrawn in the 
course of the proceedings” (Posser 2019: § 99 VwGO, 
marginal note 4).
-
-
-
-
-
-
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6 Cooperation within the EU
6.1 Exchange of information 
at EU level
6.1.1 Migration authorities
No communication platform exists to date for discus
sion of the topic of “third-country nationals who cons
titute a threat to public security” between the German 
migration authorities and the migration authorities of 
other EU Member States. As per January 2020, for the 
purposes of the general exchange of information at 
EU and international level the Federal Office for Mig
ration and Refugees was represented through liaison 
staff at the partner authorities of five Member States 
(in France, Greece, Italy, Poland and Hungary). The li
aison staff here can forward enquiries by the German 
migration authorities regarding third-country natio
nals, for example, to the competent bodies in the EU 
Member States. The liaison officer of the Federal Of
fice for Migration and Refugees in Italy at the time for-
warded enquiries to the Italian authorities concerning 
intelligence about Anis Amri, for example (Bundestag 
2018h).
-
-
-
-
-
-
In response to recommendations from a Federation-
Länder work group of the Standing Conference of In
terior Ministers and Senators from 6 to 8 June 2018, 
the Federal Ministry of the Interior also undertook 
measures in the area of cooperation with other Mem
ber States. These included a “sharing of knowledge 
and experience with the Netherlands within the Status 
working group [at the GTAZ – author’s note] and with 
France within the Security work group” at the ZUR 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2018c: 18). No other formats for 
communication between the Federal Office for Mig
ration and Refugees and the migration authorities of 
other EU Member States are known.
-
-
-
There are also various formats for the exchange of in
formation and experiences at EU level in the field of 
prevention and deradicalisation work. The ‘Radicalisa
tion Awareness Network’ (RAN) was established by the 
European Commission in 2011, for example – in parti
cular for the purposes of knowledge-sharing between 
practitioners (KOM o. J.) There is also bilateral contact 
in connection with prevention work, in particular with 
-
-
-
France, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxem
bourg. Since the Advice Centre on “Radicalisation” was 
established at the Federal Office for Migration and Re
fugees in 2012, there has been consultation between 
NGOs or the competent authorities in other Member 
States in between one and three cases.
-
-
6.1.2 Migration authorities and security 
services
To date, there is no comparable communication and 
coordination platform at European level such as the 
GTAZ or GETZ enabling communication between the 
migration authorities and the security services and 
prison authorities. The exchange of information bet
ween the security services of the EU Member States is 
the responsibility of the Federal Criminal Police Office 
and is generally conducted bilaterally and in connec
tion with specific individual cases (written reply from 
the Federal Criminal Police Office, 2020). The Federal 
Criminal Police Office is additionally represented by 
liaison officers at the respective diplomatic missions 
in two thirds of all the countries in the world, where 
they have a “preventive and repressive remit” and are 
tasked to “prevent criminal offences […}, but can also 
initiate investigations or support investigations which 
are already in progress.” (BKA 2020d).
-
-
6.2 Schengen Information 
System (SIS)
6.2.1 General information
The abolition of border controls was adopted by the 
Schengen Convention66 in 1990. In order to maintain 
internal security, various countervailing measures were 
established, including the establishment of a joint in
vestigation and information system – the Schengen 
Information System (SIS). 
-
66 Convention of 19 June 1990 implementing the Schengen Agree
ment of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States 
of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germa
ny and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at 
their common borders.
-
-
The SIS “enables the nati-
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onal border control, customs and police authorities 
which are responsible for controls at the external bor
ders within the Schengen area to post alerts concer
ning wanted or missing persons or stolen vehicles or 
documents (BMI 2020f). 
-
-
The second generation of the Schengen Information 
System (SIS II) was introduced in 2013 on the basis 
of the legal provisions of the SIS II Council Decision 
(2007/553/JHA)67 and the EU Council Regulation  
(no. 1987/2006)68 on SIS II. “SIS II provides informa
tion on persons who do not have the right to enter or 
reside in the Schengen area. SIS II also covers infor
mation on missing persons, in particular children or 
other persons in need of protection” (BMI 2020f). “SIS 
II contains the necessary information to identify per
sons (including photographs and fingerprints) and the 
relevant data (such as the measures to be undertaken)” 
(BMI 2020f).
-
-
-
The Schengen Information System is currently being 
upgraded to SIS 3.0, which is to be used to compile 
asylum- and also residence-related decisions in a Eu
ropean database as of 2022 Each Member State has a 
national central office, the so-called SIRENE (Supple
mentary Information Request at the National Entry), 
which is responsible for intelligence sharing in connec
tion with SIS alerts at national and international level. 
SIRENE Germany is located within the Federal Crimi
nal Police Office (BKA 2020c).
-
-
-
-
Alerts can be posted in the SIS regarding persons (for 
the purpose of handover/extradition, for example) or 
objects (e.g. vehicles) (BKA 2020c). The national law 
enforcement, judicial, police, customs, foreigners, visa 
and vehicle licencing authorities, EUROPOL and the 
Eurojust agency for judicial cooperation within the 
European Union have access to the SIS, but are only 
permitted to access such SIS data as they require in 
order to perform their respective tasks (written reply 
from Federal Criminal Police Office, 2020). “Possible 
grounds for issuing alerts are:
 Refusal of entry for persons who are not entitled to 
enter or reside in the Schengen area
 Determination of whereabouts and detainment of 
persons for whom a European arrest warrant has 
been issued
-
-
 Assistance in searching for wanted persons in 
accordance with the requirements of the law 
enforcement and judicial authorities
 Searches for and protection of missing persons
 Location of stolen or lost property” (BMI 2020f).
When personal data are stored in the SIS, the persons 
concerned can request corresponding information and 
verification of the legality of holding such data. Should 
storage of the data not be lawful, the person concer
ned can require the data to be corrected or erased. In
formation is not provided, however, “where such data 
is indispensable to performing a lawful task in connec
tion with the entry in the database and to protect the 
rights and freedoms of third parties” (BKA 2020c).
-
-
-
67 Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the estab
lishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen 
Information System (SIS II).
68 Regulation (EC) No. 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 20 December 2006 on the establishment, ope
ration and use of the second generation Schengen Information 
System (SIS II).
6.2.2 Alerts in the SIS: Discreet and specific 
checks
Article 36 of the SIS II Council Decision stipulates the 
objectives and conditions pertaining to the issuance of 
alerts. An alert may be issued for the purposes of di
screet or specific checks in order to prosecute criminal 
offences and to prevent threats to public security a) 
where there is a clear indication that a person intends 
to commit or is committing a serious criminal offen
ces, or b) where an overall assessment of a person, in 
particular on the basis of past criminal offences, gives 
reason to suppose that person will also commit seri
ous criminal offences in the future (Art. 36 paragraph 2 
of the SIS II Council Decision). 
-
-
-
In addition, an alert may be issued in accordance with 
national law, at the request of the authorities respon
sible for national security, where there is concrete in
dication that the information [...] is necessary in order 
to prevent a serious threat by the person concerned 
or other serious threats to internal or external nati
onal security (Art. 36 paragraph 3 of the SIS Council 
Decision). There are thus two types of alerts: 1. Alerts 
concerning criminal offences which have already been 
committed, and 2. alerts concerning persons who have 
not yet committed a criminal offence but who consti
tute a threat.
-
-
-
-
German alerts for the purposes of discreet or specific 
checks69 take place in accordance with Art. 36 of the 
SIS II Council Decision and the existing national regu-
69 “An alert for the purpose of ‘discreet checks’ is aimed solely 
at discreet registration of the person or object specified in the 
alert. The alert does not permit the covert searching of objects. 
An alert for the purpose of ‘specific checks’ is aimed at searching 
persons and objects. This is an open measure in the presence 
of or with the knowledge of the person concerned” (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2018j: 2).
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checks69 take place in accordance with Art. 36 of the 
SIS II Council Decision and the existing national regu
lations (Code of Criminal Procedure, Federal Criminal 
Police Office Act, Federal Police Act, Federal Act on 
the Protection of the Constitution, Customs Investi
gation Service Act70, Land police acts) (Deutscher Bun
destag 2018j: 8). The police authorities of the Län
der and the Federal Police are responsible for issuing 
alerts in the SIS (Section 31 subs. 1 of the Federal Po
lice Act). Where necessary in order to discharge the 
duties of the Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution, the Military Counter-Intelligence Service 
and the Federal Intelligence Service, these authorities 
may also issue an alert concerning a person or an ob
ject in the police information system to provide noti
fication that the person or object concerned has been 
located (Section 17 subs. 3 of the Federal Act on the 
Protection of the Constitution). The Customs Crimi
nological Office may also issue alerts in the SIS in di
scharging its duties (Section 10 subs. 1 of the Customs 
Investigation Service Act). 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
When alerts are issued for persons in the SIS, the ‘type 
of criminal offence’, for example a ‘terrorism-related 
activity’, is specified by the authority issuing the alert 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2018j: 5f.). A note can also be 
added to alerts such that, in the event of a match, the 
end user is requested to “contact the SIRENE office 
immediately” (Deutscher Bundestag 2018j: 3). When 
such an alert is issued, the SIRENE office of the issu
ing Member State notifies all other SIRENE offices 
(7.4. lit. a of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 
2015/21971).
-
Table 9 presents the number of alerts for persons in 
order to prosecute criminal offences and to prevent 
threats to public security pursuant to Art. 36 paragraph 
2 of the SIS II Council Decision. The number of alerts 
in the SIS has increased almost four-fold from 2014 to 
2020 (2014: 40,004, 2020: 155,222). The German alerts 
over recent years account for only a very small share 
of the total number of SIS alerts pursuant to Art. 36 
paragraph 2 in the Schengen area as a whole (approx. 
1-4%). The number of German alerts pursuant to Art. 
36 paragraph 2 have increased slightly more than two
fold (2014: 1,166, 2020: 2,810). A relatively large num
ber of German alerts pursuant to Art. 36 paragraph 2 
contain the additional note ‘contact SIRENE office im
mediately’ (around half of all alerts with this adden
dum in the Schengen area and around 10-17% of all 
-
-
-
-
-
German alerts). Furthermore, as per 1 January 2020 the 
SIS contained a total of 1,731 alerts for persons with 
the characteristic ‘terrorism-related activity’ pursuant 
to Art. 36 paragraph 2 of the SIS II Council Decision. 
Of these, more than one quarter had been issued by 
German authorities (446 persons).
Table 10 shows the number of alerts issued for per
sons to prevent a serious threat by the person concer
ned or other serious threats to internal or external na
tional security pursuant to Art. 36 paragraph 3 of the 
SIS II Council Decision. While far less alerts are issued 
pursuant to Art. 36 paragraph 3 than pursuant to para. 
2 of the SIS Council Decision, this number has never
theless also risen sharply. The total number of alerts 
in the Schengen area has increased more than twelve
fold (2014: 1,046, 2020: 12,726) and the corresponding 
number in Germany has grown more than three-fold 
(2014: 433, 2020: 1,526), with Germany accounting for 
the most alerts relating to persons pursuant to Art. 36 
paragraph 3 in 2017. 
-
-
-
-
-
In addition, the incidence of alerts pursuant to Art. 36 
paragraph 3 which contain the addendum ‘contact SI
RENE office immediately’ is very much higher. Around 
half of all alerts in the Schengen area contain the ad
dendum. In Germany, the addendum “contact SIRENE 
office immediately” was included in roughly one third 
of all alerts. Furthermore, as per 1 January 2020 the 
SIS contained a total of 8,105 alerts for persons with 
the characteristic ‘terrorism-related activity’ pursuant 
to Art. 36 paragraph 2 of the SIS II Council Decision. 
Of these, just under 14% had been issued by German 
authorities (1,115 persons). This means that almost 
three quarters of all German alerts concerning persons 
pursuant to Art. 36 paragraph 2 were “terrorism-rela
ted”. The share of German alerts is greater among all 
alerts pursuant to Art. 36 paragraph 3 than among all 
alerts pursuant to Art. 36 paragraph 2.
-
-
-
69 “An alert for the purpose of ‘discreet checks’ is aimed solely 
at discreet registration of the person or object specified in the 
alert. The alert does not permit the covert searching of objects. 
An alert for the purpose of ‘specific checks’ is aimed at searching 
persons and objects. This is an open measure in the presence 
of or with the knowledge of the person concerned” (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2018j: 2).
70 German: Gesetz über das Zollkriminalamt und die Zollfahn
dungsämter.
71 Commission Impl menting Decision (EU) 2015/219 f 29 
Ja uary 2015 r lacing the Annex to Implementing Decision 
2013/115/EU on the Sirene Manual and oth r implem nting 
measures for the second generation Schengen Information 
System (SIS II).
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Table 9: Alerts for persons pursuant to Art. 36 paragraph 2 of the SIS II Council Decision (Decision 2007/533/JHA)
Reference 
date
Alerts pursuant to Art. 36 paragraph 2 
of the SIS II Council Decisions1)
Alerts pursuant to Art. 36 paragraph 2 
of the SIS II Council Decision1)
Schengen area 
as a whole
of which, with 
addendum 
“contact 
SIRENE office 
immediately”
of which, 
specifying 
characteristic 
“terrorism-
related activity”
Germany 
as a whole
of which, 
with addendum 
“contact 
SIRENE office 
immediately”
of which, 
specifying 
characteristic 
“terrorism-
related activity”
01.01.2014 40,004 k. A. k. A. 1,166 k. A. k. A.
01.01.2015 44,493 k. A. k. A. 1,720 k. A. k. A.
01.01.2016 61,575 k. A. k. A. 1,908 k. A. k. A.
01.01.2017 86,373 574 k. A. 2,517 267 k. A.
01.01.2018 118,174 753 k. A. 2,703 377 k. A.
01.01.2019 142,046 870 k. A. 2,717 470 k. A.
01.01.2020 155,222 820 1,731 2,810 446 482
Source: Deutscher Bundestag 2018j: 3, 2018k: 6ff., 2019c: 6, 2020b: 9ff.
1) Multiple categorisations possible.
Table 10: Alerts for persons pursuant to Art. 36 paragraph 3 of the SIS II Council Decision (Decision 2007/533/JHA)
Reference 
date
Alerts pursuant to Art. 36 paragraph 3 
of the SIS II Council Decision1)
SIS II alerts pursuant to Art. 36 paragraph 3 
of the SIS II Council Decision1)
Schengen area 
as a whole
of which, 
with addendum 
“contact 
SIRENE office 
immediately”
Alerts, specifying 
characteristic 
“terrorism-rela
ted activity”
-
Germany 
as a whole
of which, 
with addendum 
“contact 
SIRENE office 
immediately”
Alerts, specifying 
characteristic 
“terrorism-rela
ted activity”
-
01.01.2014 1,046 k. A. k. A. 433 k. A. k. A.
01.01.2015 1,854 k. A. k. A. 845 k. A. k. A.
01.01.2016 7,945 k. A. k. A. 1,308 k. A. k. A.
01.01.2017 9,735 5,889 k. A. 1,749 241 k. A.
01.01.2018 11,238 5,856 k. A. 1,652 399 k. A.
01.01.2019 14,394 5,953 k. A. 1,532 433 k. A.
01.01.2020 12,726 5,801 8,105 1,526 453 1,115
Source: Deutscher Bundestag 2018j: 3, 2018k: 6f., 2019c: 6, 2020b: 9ff.
1) Multiple categorisations possible.
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6.2.3 Access to alerts in the SIS for the 
migration authorities
Access by the Federal Office for Migration and 
Refugees to alerts in the SIS
To date, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 
has no access to the SIS. This situation is set to alter 
with the planned upgrade of the SIS, which is to be 
replaced by SIS 3.0 in 2020. The project “SIS 3.0 sub
project 2 – Return expertise” (SIS 3.0 Teilprojekt 2 – 
Fachlichkeit Rückkehr), which is being pursued under 
the overall direction of the Federal Office for Migra
tion and Refugees, has been assigned the task of im
plementing three EU regulations on upgrading of the 
Schengen Information System in Germany. In future, 
not only the police authorities, but also all foreig
ners authorities throughout Germany and the Fede
ral Office for Migration and Refugees will enter return 
alerts/alerts relating to refusal of entry and residence 
in the SIS. These alerts are also to include decisions 
under asylum and residence law.
-
-
-
-
-
Access by foreigners authorities to alerts 
in the SIS
Prior to every decision under the law on foreigners, 
the foreigners authorities check by reference to the 
SIS whether an alert has been issued by the German 
authorities and courts or by authorities and courts of 
other Schengen states regarding refusal of entry for 
the person concerned pursuant to Section 96 of the 
Schengen Convention (5.5.4.0.1.1 of the General Ad
ministrative Regulation to the Residence Act). The for
eigners authorities are further required to initiate the 
issuance and erasure of alerts concerning refusal of 
entry in the SIS pursuant to Art. 96 of the Schengen 
Convention via the competent local police stations, 
using an official form. These alerts are then forwarded 
to the Central Register of Foreigners. SIRENE Ger
many, which is located within the Federal Criminal Po
lice Office, coordinates the exchange of information in 
cases of matches (5.5.4.3 of the General Administra
tive Regulation to the Residence Act). The foreigners 
authorities themselves have no access to alerts for the 
purposes of discreet or specific checks on grounds of 
threats to public security pursuant to Art. 36 of the 
SIS II Council Decision.
-
-
-
-
-
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7 Challenges and best practice
7.1 Implementation of 
measures under 
residence law
From the perspective of the Federal Interior Ministry 
and the interior ministries of the Länder, the adminis
trative and legal hurdles pertaining to the repatriation 
of third-country nationals who constitute a threat to 
public security are among the major challenges in this 
context. Removals sometimes prove unenforceable be
cause travel documents are missing and difficulties are 
encountered in obtaining passport substitutes (Deut
scher Bundestag 2019a: 12). In view of similar challen
ges relating to the Amri case, the then federal minister 
of the interior, Thomas de Maizière, announced that 
there would be “an increased focus on including other 
policy fields, in particular the areas of foreign, eco
nomic and development policy, in negotiations with 
countries of origin on taking back their own nationals” 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2017d: 21162).
-
-
-
-
-
In addition, removal is generally prohibited where the 
person to be removed originates from a country in 
which they face human rights violations. In the case 
of third-country nationals who constitute a threat to 
public security, removals are sometimes made con
tingent on diplomatic assurances from the relevant 
government body in the country of origin (BVerwG 
2017). The practice of obtaining diplomatic assuran
ces is strongly criticised by human rights organisations. 
Maria Scharlau, expert on international law at Amnesty 
International, criticises the fact that “diplomatic assu
rances from the country of destination […] are usually 
hollow promises”, for example, stating that “they offer 
no effective protection from torture. As a general rule, 
no checks are carried out as to whether these pro
mises are kept” (Flade 2017). In individual cases, the 
competent authorities may refrain from providing the 
countries of destination with any information on the 
grounds for removal, for the above-stated reasons. In 
the case of a removed Nigerian potential offender who 
had appealed against his removal, this practice led to 
the Federal Administrative Court ruling that no prohi
bition of removal pursuant to Section 60 of the Resi
-
-
-
-
-
-
dence Act applied under law. In its explanation of the 
grounds for this ruling, the court stated that the Ger
man authorities had not provided the Nigerian autho
rities with any information on the background to the 
removal, in view of which the removed person did not 
face any threats in this respect (Federal Administrative 
Court, judgement of 22 August 2017, no. 38).
-
-
The Länder also face challenges when it comes to ini
tiating measures to terminate the residence of per
sons who constitute a threat to public security but 
who have not yet committed any criminal offences. 
For a long time, the Länder refrained from issuing re
moval orders pursuant to Section 58a of the Residence 
Act, because the provision was “practically meaning
less” due to “doubts as to its formal constitutionality 
and on account of contentious questions of interpreta
tion regarding the requirements pertaining to forecas
ting of the level of threat involved” (Kluth 2019: § 58a 
AufenthG marginal note 1). A precedent was establis
hed in 2017, however, when the Federal Administra
tive Court dismissed appeals by two Salafist potential 
offenders (from Algeria and Nigeria) against their re
moval orders pursuant to Section 58a of the Residence 
Act. The Federal Administrative Court found that “no 
constitutional reservations of a formal or substantive 
nature apply to Section 58a [of the Residence Act – 
author’s note]” (Kluth 2019: § 58a AufenthG, margi
nal note 3; Chapter 5.3.2). The court ruled that in both 
cases there were sufficient indications and evidence, as 
“both had long been firmly established in the radical 
Islamist scene in Germany”, they “sympathised” with 
the terrorist organisation ‘Islamic State’ (IS) and they 
had “repeatedly announced their intention to carry out 
acts of violence using weapons” (BVerwG 2017). Boris 
Pistorius (Social Democratic Party, Sozialdemokrati
sche Partei Deutschlands, SPD), interior minister of 
Lower Saxony, noted that this ruling had “made legal 
history”, and the then interior minister of North Rhine-
Westphalia, Ralf Jäger, (SPD) announced to examine 
whether the ruling could be used as a “blueprint” for 
ordering removal orders against potential offenders 
(Flade, 2017).
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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7.2 Challenges relating to the 
exchange of information 
between authorities
7.2.1 At national level
In Germany, the police authorities of the Länder are 
responsible for averting dangers and prosecuting 
crimes, and the foreigners authorities and the Fede
ral Office for Migration and Refugees are responsible 
for residence- and asylum-related measures respec
tively. Consequently, cases involving third-country na
tionals who constitute a threat to public security and 
against whom measures are consequently to be initi
ated under residence and asylum law requires coope
ration between numerous authorities. The necessary 
exchange of information between various authorities 
with divergent objectives often represents a challenge 
in practice. Efforts to improve the exchange of intelli
gence are being pursued in “close cooperation” within 
the bounds of the relevant legislation and via the joint 
working groups at the GTAZ. The working groups in 
particular have led to an “intensification of coopera
tion” in recent years (written reply from the Federal 
Criminal Police Office, 2020).
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
With regard to the exchange of information between 
authorities and relevant actors in the fields concerned, 
the federal structure in Germany gives rise to a num
ber of challenges. These relate primarily to the coor
dination of security- and residence-related measures 
between the Land authorities and federal authorities. 
The establishment of the various information sharing 
platforms for the different Land and federal authori
ties in the respective PMC categories has led to an im
provement in information sharing, however (including 
GTAZ, GTEZ, ZUR; Chapters 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.3).
-
-
-
-
Federal Data Protection Act and European 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
The European General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR)72, which entered into force on 24 May 2016, 
does not apply, for example, to the processing of per
sonal data by the competent law enforcement autho
rities, including for the purposes of protection from 
and the aversion of threats to public security (Section 
2 subs. 2 lit. d of the GDPR). Whereas certain difficul
ties used to apply with regard to the transfer of secu
rity-relevant information from the partners in the field 
at the Advice Centre on “Radicalisation” at the Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees (Chapter 4.2) to the 
security services, because the advisors were not always 
able to forward security-related cases directly to the 
competent authorities, this situation has now changed 
with the introduction of the new Federal Data Protec
tion Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, BDSG), which en
tered into force to implement the European General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on 25 May 2018. 
It is now clearly stipulated in Section 24 subs. 1 no. 1 
of the Federal Data Protection Act that the proces
sing of personal data is also permissible by private bo
dies where this is necessary in order to avert threats to 
state or public security.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
7.7.2 At EU level
The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees is cur
rently represented by liaison staff at the relevant mi
gration authorities in five other Member States. The 
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees bemoans 
the lack of a larger network of migration authorities in 
security-related issues, however, noting that bilate
ral enquiries to authorities of individual Member Sta
tes sometimes receive delayed or inadequate replies. 
In view of the stated challenges, the Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees calls for improved networking 
and greater transparency among the Member States 
with regard to adopted security- and residence-related 
decisions. The introduction of EU-wide databases for 
asylum- and residence-related decisions and the pos
sibility of matching registers (such as criminal records) 
would also facilitate the identification of persons who 
constitute a threat to public security. This should be 
preceded by clear legal provisions and clear definition 
of the respective areas of competence as well as revie
wed in accordance to European law, however.
-
-
-
-
-
-
72 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural per
sons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC.
-
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In the area of return measures, the Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees proposes that third-coun
try nationals who hold a residence permit in another 
EU Member State should be returned directly to their 
country of origin, rather than first returning them from 
the Member State to the other Member State. A mu
tual cost reimbursement mechanism could be imple
mented in this connection.
-
-
-
In the area of the police, EUROPOL has been estab
lished in recent years as the central coordinating body 
for information sharing between the security services 
and has been invested with more extensive powers. 
The Federal Criminal Police Office is of the view that a 
similarly structured central body would also be expe
dient for the area of migration, in order to exploit syn
ergies and avoid redundancies (written reply from Fe
deral Criminal Police Office, 2020).
-
-
-
-
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8 Conclusions
In summary, it can be stated that the migration autho
rities play an important role in Germany when it comes 
to dealing with third-country nationals who constitute 
a threat to public security. In connection with Islamist 
terrorist attacks in a number of European and German 
cities in recent years, the corresponding powers and 
scopes of responsibility in this field have been further 
broadened.
-
The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees serves 
as the coordinating body for the transfer of informa
tion and the evaluation of intelligence from the Fe
deral Criminal Police Office and the Federal Office 
for the Protection of the Constitution where measu
res under the law on foreigners, asylum or nationality 
come into consideration on account of a threat to pu
blic security (Section 75 subs. 11 of the Residence Act). 
In view of the given federal structure and the resi
dence- and security-related tasks of the Länder, repre
sentatives of the security services and interior authori
ties in particular consider information sharing between 
different Länder and authorities to be central to the 
enforcement of measures terminating the residence 
of third-country nationals who constitute a threat to 
public security. The Federal Office for Migration and 
Refugees plays an important role here in particular by 
virtue of its overall leadership of the Status working 
group at the GTAZ. On the basis of their experience 
with information sharing at national level, a number of 
authorities propose establishing similar structures and 
databases at EU level. An initial step in this direction is 
already observable in the ongoing development of the 
SIS, which is intended to assure national security ser
vices and migration authorities of Europe-wide access 
to asylum- and residence-related measures in future.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
The migration authorities are also specifically invol
ved in the identification of persons who constitute a 
potential threat to public security. The Federal Of
fice for Migration and Refugees obtains knowledge of 
security-related aspects in the course of the asylum 
or revocation procedure, for example, which it duly 
forwards to the security services. The foreigners au
thorities also acquire a knowledge of security-rela
ted information on certain persons, and also forward 
these findings to the security services. The migration 
authorities are also specifically involved in implemen
-
-
-
-
-
ting residence- and asylum-related measures. Through 
cooperation within the GTAZ, GETZ, ZUR or individual 
Land working groups, the security services and mig
ration authorities seek to ensure close coordination in 
individual cases and to swiftly overcome any challen
ges relating to the enforcement of residence-termina
ting measures in particular. 
-
-
-
In addition to the restrictive measures in the area of 
combating extremism, preventive measures form an 
additional focus of work in Germany which has been 
under expansion for some years now. Here too, the Fe
deral Office for Migration and Refugees plays a parti
cularly important role with its Advice Centre on “Radi
calisation” and through its work in the Deradicalisation 
working group at the GTAZ. 
-
-
-
For many years now, numerous Land interior ministries, 
as well as the Federal Ministry of the Interior, have 
been pointing to various legal and administrative chal
lenges in returning persons who constitute a threat to 
public security. Difficulties apply, for example, when 
the person concerned does not possess any travel do
cuments, the countries of destination refuse to take 
the person back or doubts exist as to whether human 
rights are respected in the country of destination and 
whether it is guaranteed that the returned person will 
not be exposed to any form of inhuman treatment.
-
-
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